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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BRUCE P. PALMER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
BRUCE P. PALMER 
Case No. 880471-CA 
Priority Catagory 2 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The defendant, Mr. Palmer, is unable to make a true 
statement that would show that the Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to consider his appeal of right. Mr. Palmer 
has evidence and believes that jurisdiction of the court 
cannot be proved, but that to the contrary, it can be 
conclusively proven that the Utah Court of Appeals has no 
lawful jurisdiction or power whatever. A thorough search of 
the Oath of Office certificates at the Utah Division of 
Archives from 1972 to June 30, 1989 has revealed that all 
elected Utah Senate members failed to qualify for public 
office following their election from November 1974 to June 
1989, a period of fourteen and one half years. On June 30, 
1989 there was no evidence in the Utah Division of Archives 
to prove that any person elected to the Utah Sentate from 
November 1974 to June 30 1989, had ever subscribed and filed 
an Oath of Office required by law, since 1974. 
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The records show that every act of Utah's "Legislature" 
during the last 14 and a half years is unofficial, null and 
void. Utah Code Annotated, 76-8-203; Utah Constitution, 
Art. 4, Sec 10. 
The legislation creating the Utah Court of Appeals and 
the circuit courts of Utah are void for failure of the 
members of the Utah Senate to qualify after being elected in 
the 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, and 1988 
general elections. A public office automatically becomes 
vacant by law when the person elected or appointed fails to 
subscribe and file the required oath or bond within 60 days 
of the beginning of the term for which he was elected or 
appointed. Utah Code Annotated, 52-2-1; Utah Const. Art. 
IV, Sec. 10; 1 Stat 23; U.S. Const. Art. 6. 
No elected Senate candidate in Utah has qualified for 
public office in fourteen and one half years. All of the 
appointments requiring the advice and consent of the Senate 
are necessarily void, including all of the appointments of 
all circuit court judges and all appeals court judges, and 
all supreme court justices appointed during the last 
fourteen and one half years, which includes all members of 
the present Supreme Court. All legislation relating to 
those courts made during the last fourteen and one half 
years is necessarily void. Most if not all of the present 
court rules are also void. It is clear that the Utah Court 
of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the appeal in 
this case or in any other case, past, present or future and 
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all former decisions are null and void for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction and for lack of judicial power. This neglect 
and unofficial criminal conduct by elected candidates is 
detrimental to the security of the people of Utah in the 
extreme. Utah Const., Art 4, Sec. 10; Utah Code Annotated, 
76-8-203; Utah Code Annotated, 52-1-2 and 52-2-1. 
The corresponding official misconduct is equally 
detrimental. Only a person holding public office or 
otherwise authorized by law could administer the required 
oath of office to a person seeking to qualify for office. 
Many oaths of office for elective state office that were 
administered during the last fourteen and a half years were 
administered by persons not holding public office and who 
were not otherwise authorized by law at the time the oaths 
were unlawfully administered. Due process of law is now 
virtually nonexistent in Utah and has been for many years. 
The certified oaths for Utah Senate candidates cannot be 
backdated, subscribed and filed after the sixty day statute 
of limitation as were those by and for Norman H. Bangerter, 
W. Val Oveson, Tom L. Allen, Edward T. Alter, and R. Paul 
Van Dam on April 11, 1989, and I. Daniel Stewart, Michael 
D. Zimmerman and Gordon R. Hall, all of whom failed to file 
as required by law, until after Mr. Palmer and other persons 
revealed the oaths were not on file as of March 20, 1989 
for the three unofficial Supreme Court justices, and as of 
April 10, 1989, for the five unofficial executive officers, 
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and as of April 12, and June 30, 1989 for the unofficial 
members of the Utah House and Senate. It was not until 
after the clerk of the Supreme Court was notified that the 
oaths of office for Gordon R. Hall, I. Daniel Stewart and 
Michael D. Zimmerman were not on file in the Utah Archives 
that they were made, backdated and delivered to the Division 
of Archives, well after the sixty day statute of limitation. 
52-2-1, Utah Code Annotated; Utah Const., Art IV, Sec. 10. 
Gordon R. Hall was not in office when he administered 
an oath to Norman H. Bangerter, W. Val Oveson, Tom L. Allen, 
Edwart T. Alter, R. Paul Van Dam, I. Daniel Stewart and 
Michael D. Zimmerman on January 2, 1989. He not only failed 
to have them subscribe and file their oaths of office, but 
he had not filed his own oath of office on January 7, 1987, 
and also falsified his own sworn statement and got Geoffrey 
Butler to falsify it for him in March of 1989. Each of the 
eight men involved know that their oath certificates are 
not true. They were not subscribed on the date stated nor 
were they filed or subscribed within sixty days of the 
beginning of their term of office. They all failed to 
qualify and their offices are vacant as a matter of law and 
all of their acts are unofficial and are in violation of the 
criminal statute 76-8-203, Utah Code Annotated, and deny due 
process of law to all people of Utah, not just Mr. Palmer. 
Gordon R. Hall's oath of office was not filed timely and 
was back-dated more than two full years and delivered to the 
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Utah Division of Archives more than 26 months late, and was 
signed by Geoffrey Butler, clerk of the Supreme Court who 
serves at the pleasure of the Supreme Court justices. This 
is a conspiracy of great magnitude in Utah's ever expanding 
unofficial State Government, Corruption keeps spreading. 
Because the newly elected Senate members were unofficial 
from the time of there respective elections in 1974 to June 
30, 1989, the appointments of Christine Durham and Richard 
C. Howe were void from the time they were made, as were the 
appointments of Gordon R. Hall, I. Daniel Stewart, and 
Michael D. Zimmerman. All positions on the Supreme Court 
are now vacant. Backdating and falsifying of the oaths of 
office certification does not defeat the laws and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution and 
laws of the United States of America which require the oath 
to be taken, subscribed, recorded, certified, and filed 
before each duly elected or appointed person enters upon the 
duties of the public office to which he or she was elected 
or appointed in the State of Utah. Lawlessness will not 
prevail. Truth and justice will prevail. 
The proof is positive and absolute that neither the 
circuit courts of Utah, including the trial court, or the 
Utah Court of Appeals were ordained by Constitutional law, 
and therefore lack of Jurisdiction is total and complete. 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-3, an unofficial act, is void. 
It is repugnant to the Utah and U. S. Constitutions. 
-5-
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is an appeal of right which is rightly and 
necessarily taken to protect the defendant from the 
unlawful, unconstitutional and clearly fraudulent and void 
criminal conviction in which the jury was impaneled in a 
purported "circuit court" by a purported "judge" who had 
personal knowledge in his possession at the time of the 
purported trial that it was a federal felony to interfere 
with the reception of an interstate transmission of a signal 
from an earth satellite space station and who intentionally 
withheld that knowledge of the federal felony statute from 
the jury in order to falsely convict the defendant for 
exercise of a Constitutionally guaranteed, protected and 
secured right, with intent to deprive him of that right and 
other rights, including his right to do business, by acting 
in concert with the purported assistant city prosecutor and 
a purported city zoning officer, all three of whom also, 
knowingly, intentionally and willfully prosecuted the 
defendant on a false Information (to which the defendant had 
never entered a plea) in defiance of the United States 
Constitution, the laws of the United States of America and 
the Constitution and laws of the State of Utah. 
The purported judge, assistant prosecutor and zoning 
officer (none of whom legally hold office) also deliberately 
withheld from the jury knowledge which they had that the 
states and the cities had been preempted from enforcing laws 
and ordinances which interfere with or prevent satellite 
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signal reception and they misled the jury by concealing the 
felony statute and federal preemption regulation from the 
jury while deliberatly working to convince, persuaded and 
direct the jury to convict the defendant when he had not 
violated the preempted and void city ordinance, which did 
not even apply to Mr, Palmer's nonconforming land, or 
nonconforming structures or nonconforming uses, which come 
under Salt Lake City Code, 51-8-1 (1986), where not 
prohibited by the United States and Utah Constitutions nor 
prohibited or preempted by federal law. 
All this deception was carried out in a void court 
acting under void laws enacted by a void legislature whose 
elected members all failed to qualify to hold public office 
in 1987 and again in 1989, and whose elected Senators have 
all failed to qualify to hold public office for more than 
fourteen years, from 1975 to June 30, 1989, and for those 
fourteen and a half years not one of their oaths of office 
was filed according to law and all of the legislative acts 
for the last fourteen and a half years are unofficial and 
are absolutely void and neither the circuit court or the 
Utah Court of Appeals are lawful courts in the State of 
Utah. The void trial was held in the void Fifth Circuit 
Court for Salt Lake City, where Floyd H. Gowans, 
impersonating a judge, unlawfully presided at the trial on 
the false charges of improper satellite dish placement under 
the void Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Sections 51-
5-6 and 51-5-7, which first differentiates between satellite 
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antennas, allowing them only in required back yards without 
allowing other types of Antennas in required back yards, and 
denying satellite antennas to persons who have no required 
back yards, side yards, or front yards on nonconforming land 
which prevents reception on the nonconforming land Mr, 
Palmer has, if the ordinance were permitted to be construed 
to prohibit reception of satellite signals on nonconforming 
land which use cannot possibly conform to the general 
provisions of SLC Code Title 51, and 51-5-6 and 51-5-7. It 
is absurd. 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is not provided in Section 
78-2-3, Utah Code Annotated, because that code provision is 
void, it having been enacted by an unofficial legislature 
that did not have sufficient oaths of office on file in the 
Utah Division of Archives, office of Lieutenant Governor or 
office of Secretary of State as required by the Utah Code 
Annotated, Sections 52-1-2, 52-2-1 and 76-8-203, before 
attempting to enact the legislation purporting to grant 
statutory jurisdiction to the unofficial Utah Court of 
Appeals. Utah Const., Art. IV, Section 10; U.S. Const., 
Art. VI; and 1 Stat 23, Section 2, (1789). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES INCLUDING JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 
1. Whether the acts purporting to create the circuit 
courts of Utah and the Utah Court of appeals and provide for 
the appointment and compensation of the judges thereof, and 
all other purported acts of the Utah legislature since 1974 
are unofficial, null and void? 
2. Whether all the persons who were elected in 1974 to 
serve in the Utah Senate and all other persons elected after 
1974 to serve in the Utah Senate failed, under provisions of 
the Constitution and laws of the United States and the 
Constitution and laws of the State of Utah, to qualify to 
hold public office following their election? 
3. Whether a person who is elected to serve in a 
public office in the State of Utah is required by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States and by the 
Constitution and laws of the State of Utah to take and 
subscribe and file an oath of office before entering upon 
he duties of the office to which that person was elected? 
4. Whether a person is guilty of unofficial misconduct 
if he exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions 
of a public office when he has not taken and filed the 
required oath of office? 
5. Whether whenever any person duly elected or 
appointed to any office of the state or any of its political 
subdivisions, fails to qualify for such office within sixty 
days after the date of beginning of the term of office for 
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which he was elected or appointed, such office shall 
thereupon become vacant and shall be filled as provided by 
law? 
6. Whether whenever any bond of any officer of the 
state or any of the politcal subdivisions is cancelled, 
revoked, annulled, or otherwise becomes void or of no 
effect, without another proper bond being given so that 
continuance of bonded protection is afforded, the office of 
such officer shall thereupon become vacant and shall be 
filled as provided by law? 
7. Whether the persons elected to serve in the Utah 
Senate in the 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, and 
1988 general elections filed or failed to file the required 
oath of office before entering upon the duties of the office 
of Senator in the Utah Legislature? 
8. Whether all appointments to public office to which 
the advice and consent of the Utah Senate is required are 
void because the Utah Senate was unable to act officially 
during the years 1975 through 1989 because all of the 
persons elected to serve in the senate from 1974 to 1992 
have failed to qualify for the office of Senator in the Utah 
Senate of the Utah Legislature? 
9. Whether the circuit courts of the State of Utah and 
the Utah Court of Appeals are without judicial power and 
without any kind of jurisdiction in any case whatever 
because the purported legislation creating them is void for 
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lack of legislative power in the persons enacting the 
controverted legislation which took place between January 1, 
1975 and June 30, 1989? 
10. Whether the persons elected to serve in the Utah 
House of Representatives in the 1986, and 1988 general 
elections filed or failed to file the required oath of 
office before entering upon the duties of the office 
of Representative in the Utah Legislature? 
11. Whether the persons elected to serve in the offices 
of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Auditor, Treasurer and 
Attorney General of the State of Utah in the 1984 and 1988 
general elections filed or failed to file the required oath 
of office before entering upon the duties of the respective 
executive offices? 
12. Whether the persons elected to serve in the offices 
of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Auditor, Treasurer and 
Attorney General of the State of Utah in the 1988 general 
election failed to subscribe and file the required oath 
of office before entering upon the duties of the respective 
executive offices and subscribed the oath and filed it on 
April 11, 1989, ninty nine days after the term of office 
began, and falsely back-dated the certificates, to make it 
appear that they were sworn and subscribed on January 2, 
1989, thus making the five executive offices vacant as a 
matter of law pursuant to the United States Constitution, 
Article VI; 1 Stat 23, Sec 2; Utah Constitution, Art. IV, 
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Section 10J Utah Code Annotated, Sections, 52-1-2, 52-2-1, 
and 76-8-203? 
13. Whether all the positions on the Utah Supreme Court 
are vacant because Gordon R. Hall failed to subscribe and 
file the required oath of office within sixty days of the 
beginning of the term in January 1987, and back-dated a 
fraudulent certificate in March of 1989 and subscribed and 
had it place in the Utah Division of Archives after March 
20, 1989, and I Daniel Stewart and Michael Zimmerman failed 
to file their oath certificates until after the 20th day of 
March 1989, and all original appointments to Utahfs Supreme 
Court of the persons now acting or attempting to act in 
those five positions were defective because the persons 
elected to the Utah Senate from 1974 to 1989 all failed to 
file the required oath and could not act officially for the 
people of the State of Utah? 
14. Whether Salt Lake City is preempted by federal law 
from regulating location of certain structures, including 
satellite receive only antennas, on nonconforming land with 
nonconforming structures and nonconforming uses and 
requiring an application for a variance and requiring a 
public hearing? 
15. Whether Mr. Palmer's land, structures and uses of 
his land and structures are conforming or nonconforming 
under Salt Lake City Code Title 51? 
16. Whether any of the provisions of Salt Lake City 
Code Sections, 51-5-6 and 51-5-7 apply to Mr. Palmers land? 
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17. Whether Mr. Palmer's land, structure and uses are 
located at 933 Pennsylvania Place, or 933 East Pennsylvania, 
or 933 East Pennsylvania Avenue, or 833 East Pennsylvania 
Avenue and at which one of the above locations was the 
defendant found guilty of having placed an unauthorized 
structure? 
18. Whether 933 East Pennsylvania, 933 East 
Pennsylvania Avenue and 833 East Pennsylvania Avenue are 
located within or without Salt Lake City, Utah and whether 
these represent real or imaginary addresses or locations? 
19. Whether Defendant Palmer's other 150 issues and the 
above 18 issues and the issues below are just grounds for 
reversal of the unauthorized trial court? 
20. Whether Utah's legislative, executive, and judicial 
offices are all vacant as a matter of Constitutional law? 
21. Why does the Utah Constitution require a person, 
elected or appointed to an office which is made elective or 
appointive by the Utah Constitution or by the laws made in 
pursuance of the Constitution, to take and subscribe the 
particular oath contained in the Utah Constitution to uphold 
the Constitution of the United States before he enters upon 
the duties of the office to which he is elected or 
appointed, and why does the law of Utah require that the 
oath subscribed be filed before acting or attempting to act 
in the office to which the person has been elected or 
appointed, if the filing of the oath of office is only for 
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historical purposes as claimed by Douglas Bischoff and 
Jefferey Johnson and those persons who filed after the sixty 
day statute of limitation expired, or did not file at all, 
some for more than fourteen years? Do you suppose it is 
just an old out-dated formality that no longer applies in 
modern Utah political life? Is being honest just a thing of 
the past? Is Back-dating the documents just a normal 
practice, just a normal way to get around or disobey the 
requirements of the Constitution and the laws that one has 
sworn to obey? Are County Attorneyfs and their deputies 
such as David Yocum and Walter Ellett, elected and appointed 
to office just to ignore the criminal violation of the oath 
of office provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, when every 
elected and appointed state "officialfs" acts are violation 
of the Constitution and laws of Utah and of the United 
States of America? If the prosecutors will not prosecute 
the Unofficial Misconduct of elected and appointed persons, 
who will protect the people from the criminals acting or 
attempting to act in public offices they do not lawfully 
and constitutionally hold? Is all truth in government lost? 
22. Are all bonds void for public servants who failed 
to subscribe and file their oath within the sixty day 
statute of limitation? 
23. Is the State liable for the bond of the State 
Treasurer when he filed 99 days late and 39 days after the 
sixty day statute of limitation to qualify for office before 
the office becomes vacant? 
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24. Are all bonds void for all unofficial appointments 
to positions requiring that bonds be filed? 
25. Are all warrants void which are issued by an 
unofficial State Treasurer who filed a void oath and has a 
void bond? 
26. Is an oath of office which is subscribed and filed 
late, void, or is it a falsified public record or both? 
27. Is a back-dated oath false and void, except for 
evidence in a criminal prosecution or a civil action against 
the person so subscribing, back-dating and filing the false 
oath of office certificate? 
28. What is the criminal liability for falsifying a 
public record in order to assume a vacant office before it 
is discovered to be vacant or even after it is discovered to 
be vacant, as was done by the 5 executive and 3 judicial 
unofficial officers of the State of Utah in late march and 
early april 1989? 
29. What is the criminal liability for the one person 
who falisfied all eight documents in March and April 1989, 
one for himself and seven for the two other unofficial 
justices of the Supreme Court and the five unofficial 
executive officers? 
30. Who was the unofficial justice of the Supreme Court 
that on January 17, 1987 administered the oath of office to 
the seven unofficially appointed judges of the unofficial 
Utah Court of Appeals? 
-15-
31. Is it obstruction of justice to conceal a criminal 
act from a magistrate? 
32. Is it a citizen's duty to report the crimes of 
public servants who fail to lawfully and constitutionally 
qualify for office and continue to act as if they had 
qualified? 
33. To whom do you report the crime when all of the 
magistrates are either unofficial or are all receiving 
illegally and unconstitutionally diminished compensation for 
not doing their constitutional and lawful duty and who 
receive increases in the illegal and unconstitutional 
compensation from an unofficial legislature through an 
unofficial treasurer from falsified public accounts and 
falisified private bank accounts drawn out by unauthorized 
warrants of the Utah treasury through First Security Bank? 
34. Is all public bonding in Utah void? 
35. Is all current public debt unauthorized by law? 
36. Is all current unauthorized public debt void? 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES, TREATIES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND OTHER AUTHORITIES. 
United States Constitutional provisions: 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
IN ITS ENTIRETY WHICH IS SET OUT VERBATIM IN 
ADDENDUM "A" OF APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
The defendant asserts the whole Constitution of the 
United States of America in defense of his rights. 
He was unduly convicted to involuntary servitude. 
Article I-VII; Amendments I-XXVI; Amendments I, VI, XXI. 
Utah Constitutional provisions: 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN ITS 
ENTIRETY WHICH IS SET OUT VERBATIM IN ADDENDUM "B" 
OF APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
The defendant asserts the whole Constitution of the 
State of Utah in defense of his rights. Many of the 
amendments (post 1974) are Unconstitutional and void. 
Articles I, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, XI-XXII, XXIII. 
United States Statutes: 
UNITED STATES STATUTES WHICH ARE SET OUT VERBATIM 
IN ADENDUM "C" OF APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF ON 
APPEAL OR IN APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF. 
The defendant asserts all United States statutes 
made in pursuance of the United States Constitution 
in defense of his rights. Many acts are void. 
18 USCA 2-8, 241, 242, 331-334, 371, 1367, 1961-1965 
42 USCA 1983-1988; 47 USCA 151, 705; 1 Stat 23, 246 
USCA Amend. I, VI, XXI. 
Utah State Statutes: 
UTAH STATE STATUTES WHICH ARE SET OUT VERBATIM IN 
ADDENDUM "D" APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF ON APPEAL OR 
ARE SET OUT VERBATIM IN APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF. 
The defendant asserts all valid Utah statutes made 
in pursuance of the Utah Constitution in defense of 
his rights. Many acts are unconstitutional and void. 
All post 1974 acts are unconstitutional and void. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 52-1-2, 52-2-1, 76-8-203. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-3 is void. 
-17-
United States Treaties: 
The defendant asserts all United States treaties 
made under the authority of the United States in 
defense of his rights. Many treaties are void. 
United Nations Charter: Human Rights Resolution (1946) 
Satellite Treaties: 
United States Agency Rules: 
UNITED STATES AGENCY RULES ARE SET OUT VERBATIM IN 
ADDENDUM "F" OF APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
The defendant asserts all valid United States 
Agency rules in his defense. Many rules are void. 
Federal Communication Commission Rules: 
47 CFR 25.104 (This rule may be void). 
Utah State Court Rules: 
The defendant asserts that the new Utah Court rules 
are unconstitutional and void, and deny due process, 
and effectively deny the defendant his right of appeal. 
Salt Lake City Ordinances: 
SALT LAKE CITY CODE SET OUT VERBATIM IN ADDENDUM 
"E" and "P" OF APPELLANTfS ORIGINAL BRIEF ON 
APPEAL OR IN APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF. 
The defendant asserts all Salt Lake City ordinances 
made in pursuance of the United States Constitution 
and Utahfs Constitution in his defense. Many are Void. 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.01.010 (Addendum "E") 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.01.020 (Addendum "E") 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.01.030 (Addendum "E") 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.01.040 (Addendum "E") 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.01.050 (Addendum "E") 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.010 (Addendum "E") 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.020 (Addendum "E") 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.030 (Addendum "E") 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.040 (Addendum "E") 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.050 (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.060 (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.04.070 (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.12.010 (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.12.020 (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.12.030 (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.12.040 (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Section 1.12.050 (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-5 (1982) (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-6 (1982) (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-7 (1982) (Addendum "E" 
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-6(12) (1986) (Addm."P" 
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-7 (1986) (Addendum "P" 
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-5-23 (1986): 
All fences, walls, or similar structures shall 
be erected entirely within the property lines 
of the property they are intended to serve. 
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-8-1 (1986): 
The lawful use of any building, structure, or 
land, existing at the time of the passage of 
of this title may be continued, though such use 
does not conform with the provisions of this 
title, subject to the controls and restrictions 
placed thereon elsewhere in this chapter. 
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-8-4 (1986) (Addendum "E") 
Section 51-8-4 is preempted, unconstitutional and void. 
(Ordinance requiring dish antenna user to apply 
for a permit and variance and go through a public 
hearing before installation of a Satellite receive 
only antenna is unconstitutional and void.) 
Salt Lake City Code, Sec. 51-34-1(1)(A), (1986): 
Request for Variance $50.00 is Void. 
Other Authorities: See Appellant's Brief page xxxiii. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/appellant Bruce Palmer (Palmer) was charged 
without an Information with violating Section 51-5-7 Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City by unlawfully placing an 
unlawful structure, a satellite dish antenna, in his front 
yard. The facts when viewed in a light most favorable to 
upholding the jury verdict, are as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Bruce Palmer ("Palmer") is not the owner 
of the real property at 833 East Pennsylvania Avenue. 
Plaintifffs Exhibit 4, (R. 50-51). No such property exists. 
2. Craig Spangenberg of the Salt Lake City Building 
and Housing Division did not receive a complaint concerning 
833 East Pennsylvania Avenue (R. 37). At that location, he 
did not observe a satellite dish antenna located in the 
front yard (R. 38). Spangenberg advised the defendant that 
the satellite dish in the front yard was a violation of a 
(void) Salt Lake City ordinance on December 16, 1987. (R. 
43). There is no required front yard at that address. 
3. On December 17, 1987, Spangenberg issued Palmer a 
void Notice and Order by certified mail (R. 43-44) notifying 
the defendant that he was in violation of Salt Lake City 
Ordinance No. 51-5-7 allowing only certain structures in the 
front yard and ordering Palmer to remove a satellite dish 
located on his property before January 4, 1988. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6). A light pole is not prohibited. 
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4. A void misdemeanor citation for violation of Salt 
Lake City Ordinance 51-5-7 was issued to Palmer on January 
6, 1988 (CR 1-2). Ornamental features are not prohibited. 
5. Palmer was not advised of his right not to apply 
for a variance on December 31, 1987 (R. 45). Palmer did not 
apply for a variance (R. 47). At trail on July 5, 1988, the 
void jury found the defendant had not complied with the void 
notice and order (R. 52) and was guilty of violating the 
void ordinance, Section 51-5-7, Revised Ordinance Salt Lake 
City. The trial was held in a void court. U.C.A. 76-8-203. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Salt Lake City's regulation of required front yard 
structures, including satellite receive only dish antennas, 
is unconstitutional and is preempted by federal law because 
Salt Lake's regulation does differentiate between satellite 
receive only antennas and other types of antennas and the 
Salt Lake City ordinance has unreasonable health, safety and 
aesthetic objectives that do impose unreasonable limitations 
on satellite received signals. 
2. The balance of Palmer's 149 issues including the 
trial court lacking jurisdiction because judges are not 
compensated in gold or silver and defendant's fine not being 
valid because tender was in void currency rather than gold 
or silver coin have substantial merit and are grounds for 
reversal of the unconstitutional and unlawful trial court, 
and Mr. Palmer reasserts each of his one hundred and fifty 
grounds for reversal and expands the issue of jurisdiction. 
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3. The primary issue in this case is jurisdiction. 
The key general issues in this case are: (1) whether all 
the persons elected to the Utah House of Representatives 
and Utah Senate did take, subscribe and file the required 
oath of office in order to qualify to hold the office before 
entering in to the duties of the office to which they were 
elected for the years 1975 through June 1989 or whether all 
Utah legislation and all state appointments made since 1975 
are void because the legislature failed to meet United 
States and Utah Constitutional and statutory qualifications 
to hold public office; (2) Whether the individuals rights 
and the United States Constitution, United States felony 
statutes, telecommunications statutes, interstate commerce 
statutes, and statutes that guarantee, protect and secure to 
persons their individual personal rights, and the Utah 
Constitution, preempt the making of state laws and local 
ordinances such as Salt Lake City Ordinance, Title 51 
including 51-5-6 and 51-5-7 which differentiate between 
types of antennas and discriminate against users of 
satellite receive only antennas and deprive individuals of 
personal rights by attempts at regulating what structures 
are permissible on private real property including 
regulation of nonconforming land and nonconforming 
structures with nonconforming uses under regulatations 
designed to regulate conforming land and conforming 
structures with conforming uses, even property not having 
required back, side and front yards, such as Mr. Palmers, 
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and then falsely prosecuting and convicting Mr. Palmer for 
committing a "public offence" because his property does not 
conform to arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory rules 
prescribed for 4000f or more, square foot parcels of land. 
What could be more unconscionable, or more absurd or more 
unjust, or more unreasonable, than to say a man cannot watch 
television because his land does not meet the requisite size 
needed to receive permission from the community of free 
persons, when the whole reason for organizing a community is 
to protect the rights of free persons and to keep those 
persons free from unrighteous dominion and corrupt coercion? 
The trial court should be reversed and the Salt Lake City, 
Code Title 21, formerly title 51, should be held unlawful, 
unconstitutional, and void, and all Utah "laws passed" and 
"courts created" duing the years 1975 through 1989 are and 
must be held unconstitutional and void. All appointments 
to public office of the State of Utah for the years 1975 
through 1989 are necessarily void and must be so held. 
By law, each public office became vacant for all terms, 
1975 through 1989, where the required oath of office was not 
subscribed and filed by the person duly elected or appointed 
thereto, as required by the Constitutional law of the United 
States and by the Constitutional law of the State of Utah, 
and as a matter of law the exercise of the functions of the 
vacant offices by those failing to file their oaths, was and 
is unofficial, criminal and void, denies due process of law, 
and confers no power or authority upon any person or thing. 
(Details of the argument are now in addendum DD of brief.) 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF DEMANDED 
Mr. Palmer was denied due process of law in a void court. 
Every provision of the Salt Lake City Code relating to the 
regulation of Satellite Antennaes is in conflict with the United 
States Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof, and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah and the laws made in pursuance 
thereof including Title 21 formerly Title 51, and particularly 
Sections 51-5-5, 51-5-6, and 51-5-7 of Title 51 of the former 
Salt Lake City Ordinance was and is preempted by federal law and 
47 CFR regulation. It unequally regulates all types of antennas. 
The ordinance does clearly discriminate between antennaes and 
creates unreasonable limitations on satellite users. Therefore, 
federal preemption is in full force. The remainder of Palmer's 
issues are not oblivious to the record and do merit consideration 
by this Court. The jury verdict finding the defendant guilty is 
void under the Constitution of the United States, United States 
law and the Utah Constitution and Utah law for lack of lawful 
jurisdiction, and due to federal preemption of Salt Lake City's 
zoning ordinance and other Salt Lake City regulation of Satellite 
Antennaes. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is void as 
a matter of law, and because of the failure of persons elected to 
the Senate of the Utah Legislature to subscribe and file the 
required oath of office prior to acting in the office of Senator 
of Utah between December 31, 1974 to June 30, 1989, all Utah 
legislation during that period of time is unconstitutional and 
void, and all appointments requiring the advice and consent of 
the Utah Senate were and are also unconstitutional and void. 
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THEREFORE, the circuit court system and the Utah Court of Appeals 
which the unofficial and unconstitutional legislature attempted 
to create, failed as a matter of law, and the appointments of all 
judges to the circuit courts, district courts, Utah Court of 
Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court and other courts during that 
fourteen and one half year period of time are void, and all such 
offices are vacant as a matter of law, the persons having never 
been duly appointed because of the failure of the persons elected 
to become Senators to lawfully qualify themselves for office. 
As a result of the 1987 and 1989 legislators all failing to 
subscribe and file the required oaths of office, the entire 
legislature is vacant and also the five executive offices and 
three of the five offices on the supreme court are vacant for 
failure of those elected to timely file for office, and the five 
members of the supreme court also failed to qualify for office 
because their original appointments were unofficial and void. 
Mr. Palmer also includes by reference the relief demanded in 
his original Appellant's Brief on Appeal and reasserts here every 
position taken by him in that brief and in this reply brief also. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 1989, A.D. 
BRUCE P. PALMER 
Defendant 
Attorney Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered or mailed ONE copy 
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant, Bruce P. Palmer, pro 
se, 933 Pennsylvania Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, to Roger 
F. Cutler, Salt Lake City Attorney, at 451 South 200 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. 
This 28th day of August, 1989, A.D. 
I certify that Mr. Richard G. Hamp told me that one copy of 
the resubmitted reply brief would be sufficient for his office. 
BRUCE P. PALMER 
APPENDIX 
ADDENDUM "AA 
1024 696 FEDERAL S U P P L E M E N T 
and the asbestos N E S H A P regulations. 
Defendants have also failed to comply with 
the compliance orders issued to them by 
EPA. The Government has established a 
reasonable probability of success on the 
merits, the likelihood of irreparable injury 
if the asbestos in the hotel is not properly 
disposed of, and that a balancing of hard-
ships favors granting an injunction. Be-
cause it is so clearly in the public interest 
to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining 
defendants to secure the facility, properly 
dispose of the ACM, and comply with 
EPA's orders, the Government's motion is 
granted. 
SZ\ 
Kelly I. VAN METER and Lauren J. 
Van Meter, Plaintiffo. 
v. 
T O W N S H I P OF 
M A P L E W O O D , D e f e n d a n t 
Civ. A. No. 87-4677. 
United States District Court, 
D. N e w Jersey. 
Oct. 13, 1988. 
Homeowners brought action challeng-
ing ordinance which limited type of satellite 
dish antenna which they could install on 
their land. The District Court, Debevoise, 
J., held that: (1) abstention was not re-
quired, and (2) ordinance reasonably re-
stricted reception of authorized satellite 
s ignals , and thus was preempted by Feder-
al Communications Commission order regu-
lating satellite dish antenna reception. 
Judgment for plaintiffs. 
I. Federal Courts <*=»41 
Abstention, in its various manifesta-
tions, is a prudential doctrine applied to 
further comity, federalism, and judicial 
economy; in certain limited circumstances, 
federal court should abstain from exercis-
ing its jurisdiction where state proceeding 
involving the same dispute is pending. 
2. Federal Courta <s=»56 
Younger abstention did not apply to 
federal civil rights sui t challenging local 
zoning ordinance regulat ing television an-
tennas where municipality had agreed to 
stay prosecution of its municipal court com-
plaint for zoning violations until resolution 
of summary judgment motion in federal 
court. 
3. Federal Courta «=»41 
Younger abstention did not apply to 
any administrative remedy which might 
have been available to federal court plain-
tiffs where no proceeding was pending be-
fore any administrative body. 
4. Federal Courts <*=>56 
Pullman abstention was not applicable 
in federal civil rights suit brought by home-
owners chal lenging ordinance regulating 
television antennas where the ordinance 
was clear and unmistakable on its face. 
5. Civil R i g h U «=»13.9 
Exhaustion of s tate administrative 
remedies is not required before initiating 
federal civil rights action. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983. 
6. Civil Rights «=>13.4(1) 
Congressional legalization of reception 
of authorized satellite television signals 
permitted homeowners to bring federal civ-
il rights action against township whose zon-
ing ordinance allegedly interfered with fed-
eral regulation of satell ite television signal 
reception. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Communi-
cations Act of 1934, § 705<af b), as amend-
ed, 47 U.S.C.A. § 605<a, b). 
7. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<S=»229 
Exhaustion of remedies is inappropri-
ate where administrative proceedings avail-
able to the plaintiffs are not adequate 
forms for their federal claims and will not 
materially advance resolution of federal 
claims. 
VAN M E T E R r . ^ 3 W N S H I P O F M A P L E W O O D 
CU«m«696 F-Supp. 1Q24 (D.N-1. 19**) 
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8. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e L a w a n d P r o c e d u r e 
<s=>229 
E x h a u s t i o n doc t r ine is inappropr ia te 
w h e r e federal plaint iff faces s t a t e criminal 
p r o s e c u t i o n u n d e r s t a t e s t a t u t e which he 
c h a l l e n g e s a s racia l ly invalid and w h e r e 
s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e body is w i t h o u t compe-
t e n c e to reso lve t h a t claim. 
9. M u n i c i p a l C o r p o r a t i o n s <s=»53 
S t a t e s <S=»18.9 
F e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n m a y p r e e m p t s t a t e 
o r local law if t he a g e n c y in t ended to exer-
c i se exc lus ive a u t h o r i t y in t h e a r e a and the 
a g e n c y is legally au tho r i zed to displace 
s t a t e o r local r egu la t ion . 
10. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e L a w a n d P r o c e d u r e 
<3=»701 
T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s <3=>449.20 
F e d e r a l d i s t r i c t cou r t lacked subject 
m a t t e r jur isdic t ion to cons ider w h e t h e r 
F e d e r a l Communica t i ons Commiss ion ex-
c e e d e d its a u t h o r i t y in i s su ing regu la t ion 
p r e e m p t i n g s t a t e o r local zon ing with re-
s p e c t t o sa te l l i te television a n t e n n a s . Com-
m u n i c a t i o n s Act of 1934, § 405, a s amend-
ed , 47 U.S.C.A. § 405 . 
11. Z o n i n g and P l a n n i n g «=»14 
O r d i n a n c e l imi t ing size and location of 
s a t e l l i t e dish a n t e n n a s w a s a n a t t e m p t to 
d imin i sh visual i m p a c t of a n t e n n a s and 
t h u s h a d clear ly def ined hea l th , sa fe ty , or 
a e s t h e t i c objective for p u r p o s e s of FCC 
o r d e r a l lowing ce r t a in types of s t a t e and 
local r egu l a t i on of t hose a n t e n n a s . 
12. Z o n i n g and P l a n n i n g *=»I4 
O r d i n a n c e l imi t ing sa te l l i te dish anten-
n a s t o six feet in d i a m e t e r and to place-
m e n t on t he g r o u n d with p r o p e r sc reen ing 
u n r e a s o n a b l y i n t e r f e r ed wi th recept ion in 
a r e a in which ten-foot d ishes w e r e requ i red 
for a d e q u a t e recep t ion and in which anten-
n a s n e e d e d an e leva t ion a l i g n m e n t of 14 
d e g r e e s above the horizon, and t h u s was 
p r e e m p t e d by FCC order . 
1 3 . Z o n i n g and P l a n n i n g <£=»14 
O r d i n a n c e u n d e r which sa te l l i te dish 
a n t e n n a u s e r s who could no t ach ieve recep-
tion wi th in c o n s t r a i n t s imposed by ordi-
n a n c e could apply for zon ing var iance 
w o u l d no t be s a t i s f ac to ry and would not 
save ordinance , which placed an un reason-
able res t r ic t ion on single reception, f rom 
preempt ion by Federa l Communica t ions 
Commission order . 
by I rwin P . 
Val Mande l , 
Schenck, Price, Smith & King by W. 
J a m e s M a c N a u g h t o n , Morr i s town, N J . , for 
plaint iffs . 
Sca rpone & Edelson, P.A. 
Burzynsk i , Michael Edelson, 
N e w a r k , N J . , for de fendan t . 
O P I N I O N 
D E B E V O I S E , Dis t r ic t J u d g e . 
This case involves h o m e o w n e r s who in-
stal led an a n t e n n a to receive satel l i te te le-
vision s igna ls in cont ravent ion of a local 
zoning ord inance . Plaintiff h o m e o w n e r s 
claim t h a t the ord inance is inval idated by 
federal law. They seek s u m m a r y j u d g -
m e n t on the i r c laims for dec la ra to ry a n d 
injunctive relief and a t t o r n e y ' s fees. De-
fendan t municipal i ty cross-moves for dis-
missal of plaint iffs ' claims and to a m e n d i t s 
a n s w e r to a s s e r t a defense of fai lure to 
e x h a u s t admin is t ra t ive remedies . 
Background 
Plaint iffs Kelly Van Mete r and his w i f e 
Lau ren a re res iden t s of Maplewood, a 
small , s u b u r b a n communi ty in n o r t h e r n 
New J e r s e y . In la te 1985, plaintiffs decid-
ed to p u r c h a s e a sate l l i te television receive-
only a n t e n n a , known as a " T V R O " o r 
" e a r t h station*', t h a t would enable t h e m t o 
receive television s ignals t r a n s m i t t e d di-
rect ly from sa te l l i t es and view them o n a 
television monitor . After r e sea rch ing t h e 
technology and consu l t ing with a v e n d o r , 
plaintiffs p u r c h a s e d a T V R O "dish a n t e n -
na" , a lso known as a "parabol ic a n t e n n a " 
because of its shal low dish shape , a t a c o s t 
of 52500 instal led. The plaintiffs ' dish an-
t enna is ten feet in d i ame te r and c o m p o s e d 
pr imar i ly of black anodized wire mesh . 
In D e c e m b e r of 1987, plaint iffs ' a n t e n n a 
vendor pe r fo rmed a site su rvey of the V a n 
Meter p rope r ty in o rde r to de t e rmine t h e 
opt imal si te for t h e p lacement of the d i sh 
a n t e n n a . The r e su l t s of the s u r v e y indi-
ca ted tha t , g iven the charac te r i s t i cs of 
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plaintiffs' lot, the antenna would have to be 
mounted on the roof to enable plaintiffs to 
receive s ignals from all of the available 
satellite television channels. 
At the time of their purchase, plaintiffs 
were aware of a zoning ordinance enacted 
by the Maplewood Township Committee 
(the "Committee") that governed the instal-
lation of dish antennas. The "Maplewood 
Dish Antennae Zoning Ordinance" (the 
"Ordinance") became effective June 6, 
1985. Among its provisions, the Ordinance 
forbids the use of a dish antenna greater 
than six feet in height "measured at the 
highest point of its outer circumference or 
extension," requires that the dish be placed 
in the rear yard, establishes minimum set-
backs from property lines and buildings 
and requires that the dish be "screened 
from view . . . by evergreen planting which 
shall be at least six feet in height at the 
time of planting." (A complete copy of the 
Ordinance is s e t out in the Appendix to this 
Opinion). 
On May 24, 1986, plaintiffs wrote the 
township construction official seeking a 
variance from the Ordinance to allow them 
to place the antenna on their garage roof. 
The construction official, Robert Mittermai-
er. wrote the Van Meters on April 1, 1986, 
and informed them that the placement they 
proposed was "not acceptable" and denied 
their "application for permission" to erect a 
dish antenna. 
Plaintiffs attempted to appeal Mittermai-
er's decision to the township's Board of 
Zoning Adjustment (the "Board"). They 
allege that al though they complied with the 
procedures for appeal as explained by Mit-
termaier, he rejected the application be-
cause notice of publication was not timely 
served on the municipality. According to 
plaintiffs, Mittermaier, and later the mayor 
of the township, informed the plaintiffs 
that an appeal to the Board would be futile. 
Defendant disputes these allegations. 
After learning; of an order of the Federal 
Communications Commission ("FCC") that 
plaintiffs believed permitted the installa-
tion of their antenna without regard to the 
local Ordinance, plaintiffs installed the an-
tenna on the roof of their house. On May 
5, 1987, plaintiffs received a summons for 
violation of the Ordinance and were or-
dered to appear before the municipal court 
on May 19, 1987. That summons is still 
pending. 
On November 11, 1987, plaintiffs filed 
this action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 claim-
ing that the Ordinance is preempted by 
FCC regulation and that it violates their 
First Amendment rights to receive satellite 
television s ignals . They seek injunctive 
and declaratory relief and ask for attor-
ney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988. 
Abstention 
[11 Although not raised directly as a 
bar to this action by defendant, I must first 
address the i ssue of abstention. Absten-
tion, in its various manifestations, is a pru-
dential doctrine applied to further comity, 
federalism and judicial economy. In cer-
tain limited c ircumstances , a federal court 
should abstain from exercis ing its jurisdic-
tion where a s ta te proceeding involving the 
same dispute is pending, Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 
669 (1971); Williams v. Red Bank Bo. of 
Educ., 662 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir.1981), where 
allowing a s tate court to construe its chal-
lenged statute could avoid the necessity of 
reaching any constitutional issue, Railroad 
Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 
U.S. 496, 61 S.CL 643. 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), 
or where the i ssue involves a complex, com-
prehensive body of s ta te regulation over an 
area of traditionally local interest, Burford 
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.CL 1098, 
87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943). Although abstention 
reflects sensitivity to s ta te sovereignty, its 
application is not the result of mere defer-
ence but reflects an accommodation be-
tween state and federal interests. 
[2] The doctrine first announced in 
Younger, supra* prevents a federal court 
from hearing a case involving strong and 
compelling state interests where a proceed-
ing between the same parties and involving 
the same issues is pending in the state 
courts. In the present case, a summons 
was issued to the plaintiffs for violation of 
the Ordinance on May 7, 1986. While 
Younger principles might arguably require 
abstention in this instance, here defendant 
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s ta tes that "Maplewood . . . has agreed to 
s tay the prosecution of its Municipal Court 
complaint against Van Meter until after 
p la int i f f s motion for summary judgment is 
decided." Because defendant has voluntar-
ily submitted to the jurisdiction of this 
court, therefore, the values underlying 
Younger are not implicated and its pruden-
tial constraints do not apply. Ohio Civil 
Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian 
Schools, Inc., All U.S. 619, 626, 106 S.CL 
2718, 2722, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986); Broum 
v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and 
Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 
491, 500 n. 9, 104 S .Ct 3179, 3184 n. 9, 82 
L.Ed.2d 373 (1984); Ohio Bureau of Em-
ployment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 
471, 480, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 1904, 52 L.Ed.2d 
513 (1977). 
[3 ] Nor does Younger abstention apply 
to any administrative remedy which may 
have been available to plaintiffs through 
the township's Board of Adjustment be-
cause no proceeding is pending before that 
body. Plaintiffs twice attempted to obtain 
a variance from the Board. Their first 
letter, requesting a "zoning variance hear-
ing at the next town meeting," was treated 
as an "application for permission" to erect 
a dish antenna and "denied" by the town-
ship construction official who also informed 
plaintiffs of their right to appeal his deci-
sion to the Board. Plaintiff discussed the 
notice requirements for a hearing applica-
tion before the Board with the construction 
official and then completed and filed an 
"Application for Hearing" and had a public 
notice of an appeal for a variance printed in 
the local newspaper. According to plain-
tiffs' certification, however, the construc-
tion official refused to accept the applica-
tion because he claimed not to have re-
ceived proof of publication in sufficient 
time. Defendant does not claim that a 
variance application is now pending and it 
is clear that the unappealed decision of a 
municipal administrative official is not a 
pending proceeding within the meaning of 
the Younger doctrine. 
[41 Pullman abstention requires a fed-
eral court to abstain when difficult and 
unsettled questions of state law must be 
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resolved before a federal question can be 
decided. The "relevant inquiry" under the 
Pullman doctrine, as the Supreme Court 
observed in Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Mid-
kiff 467 U.S. 229, 237, 104 S .Ct 2321, 2327, 
81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) "is not whether there 
is a bare, though unlikely, poasibility that 
state courts might render adjudication of 
the federal question unnecessary." Rath-
er, the question \& whether the statue is of 
an uncertain nature and " 'obviously sus-
ceptible of a limiting construction/ " Id., 
quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 
251 and n. 14, 88 S.CL 391, 397 and n. 14, 
19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). Pullman absten-
tion is inappropriate here. The language 
of the Ordinance is clear and unmistakable^ 
on its face and no difficult area of state 
law is presented for interpretation. More-
over, Pullman abstention is inappropriate 
in cases involving a claim of preemption. 
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 
185 (3d Cir.1980). 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
I must next address defendant's claim 
that plaintiffs' complaint should be dis-
missed for failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies. 
15, 6 J Exhaustion of state administra-
tive remedies is not required before initiat-
ing an action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. 
Patsy v. Florida Bo, of Regents, 457 U.S. 
496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). 
A section 1983 action may be brought for 
the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. 
sec. 1983. Congress legalized the reception 
of authorized or unencrypted satellite tele-
vision signals under the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984 (the "Cable Act"), 
as discussed at greater length below, and 
the FCC, in turn, issued the Order to mini-
mize interference with satellite television 
reception. This permits plaintiffs to bring 
a Section 1983 action for interference with 
this federal scheme. Maine v. Thiboutot, 
448 U.S. 1, 100 S .Ct 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 
(1980); see also, e.g., Kennecott Corp., su-
pra, 637 F.2d at 186 n. 5 (section 1983 
action may be brought for federal statu-
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tory rights protected by Williams Act); 
Pietroniro v. Oceanport, 764 F.2d 976, 980 
(3d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106 
S.Ct 570, 88 L.Ed.2d 554 (1985) ("In the 
absence of a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme within the regulatory scheme 
which encompasses plaintiffs' complaint," 
there is a private cause of action through 
section 1983 to redress state's failure to 
provide housing relocation assistance under 
Housing Act of 1949 and Uniform Reloca-
tion Assistance and Real Property Acquisi-
tion Policies Act of 1970). Exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is therefore not a 
bar to this action. 
[7] Exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies is further inappropriate in this in-
stance because the administrative proceed-
ings available to plaintiffs are not adequate 
forums for their federal claims and would 
not materially advance the resolution of 
this controversy. See, e.g.. Republic In-
dus., Inc. v. Central Pennsylvania Team-
sters Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290, 295 (3d 
Cir. 1982); Cerro Metal Prods, v. Marshall, 
620 F.2d 964, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1980). The 
Board's functions are narrowly limited to 
technical matters involving review of deci-
sions of administrative officers of the 
Board, interpretations of zoning maps and 
ordinances and the granting of variances. 
See NJ.S.A. sec. 40:55D-70. Its proceed-
ings are not bound by the rules of evi-
dence. NJ.S.A. sec. 40:55D-10(e). Ap-
peals from a Board decision may be taken 
to the municipality's governing body, in 
this case the township committee, only "if 
permitted by [township] ordinance." N.J. 
S.A. sec. 40:55D-17(a). Even then, appeals 
are limited to the Board's decisions on spe-
cial use variances. la\; Nickerson v. New-
ark, 220 NJ.Super. 284, 531 A.2d 1095 
(L.Div.1987). To require exhaustion of an 
administrative process that is without com-
petence to consider plaintiffs claims would 
merely delay the ultimate resolution of this 
dispute. 
[8] Finally, invocation of the exhaustion 
doctrine is also inappropriate where a fed-
eral plaintiff faces state criminal prosecu-
tion under a statute he challenges as facial-
ly invalid and where the state administra-
tive body is without competence to resolve 
the claim. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 497 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1934 n. 5, 
52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plaintiff facing qua-
si-criminal proceeding for violation of local 
zoning ordinance not required to seek zon-
ing variance). 
Since I conclude that plaintiffs are not 
required to exhaust administrative reme-
dies, defendant's motion to amend ita an-
swer to assert this affirmative defense is 
denied as futile. 
The FCC Order 
In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984 (the "Act") 
amending the Communications Act of 1934. 
The main thrust of this legislation is to 
assure that the exploding market for cable 
television technology provides the widest 
possible diversity of information services to 
the public. See House Committee on Ener-
gy and Commerce, Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984, H.R.Rep. No. 89-934, 
98th Cong., 2d Seas. 19, reprinted in part 
in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. <fe Admin.News 
4655, 4656. Recognizing that cable suppli-
ers often rely on encrypted satellite trans-
mission feeds which they then distribute 
through the cable distribution network to 
home viewers, the Act also provided for 
stiffened penalties for unauthorized satel-
lite video users who intercept and decode 
these "pirated" messages for private use. 
See 47 U.S.C. 605<a). This provision also 
contains a limited exception to liability for 
direct reception of unencrypted and autho-
rized reception of encrypted satellite tele-
vision transmissions. Ia\ at sec. 605(b). 
Congress apparently believed that unre-
stricted market forces embodied in the pur-
chasing decisions made by individual con-
sumers would be the best means of deter-
mining the viability of this information dis-
tribution technology. See 120 Cong.Rec. 
S14,286 (Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. 
Packwood) reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code 
Cong. & Admin.News, 4742, 4747. 
Relying in part on the Cable Act's satel-
lite television provisions, see 51 Fed.Reg. 
5519, 5522 (1986), the FCC issued an Order 
entitled "Preemption of local zoning of 
earth stations," found at 47 C.F.R. sec. 
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25.104. The Order provides, in relevant 
part, that: 
State and local zoning or other regula-
tions that differentiate between satellite 
receive-only antennas and other types of 
antenna facilities are preempted unless 
such regulations: 
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly de-
fined health, safety or aesthetic objec-
tive; and 
(b) Do not operate to impose unreason-
able limitations on, or prevent, reception 
of satellite delivered signals by receive-
only antennas or to impose costs on the 
users of such antennas that are exces-
sive in light of the purchase and installa-
tion cost of the equipment. 
47 C.F.R. sec. 25.104. 
Plaintiffs assert that this Order 
preempts the Maplewood Ordinance. 
Preemption of the Ordinance 
[9] A federal regulation may preempt 
state or local law if (1) the agency intended 
to exercise exclusive authority in the area 
and (2) if the agency is legally authorized 
to displace state or local regulation. New 
York v. FCC, U.S. , , 
108 S.Ct, 1637, 1641-44, 100 L.Ed.2d 48 
(1988). The intent of the FCC is clear on 
the face of the Order which explicitly pro-
vides that local regulation inconsistent with 
its requirements is preempted. 
[101 The second step of the New York 
test and defendant's assertion that the FCC 
exceeded its authority present identical in-
quiries. This court, however, lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider the question. 
Before an FCC order is submitted to judi-
cial review, the FCC must have been given 
the opportunity to reconsider its position. 
47 U.S.C. sec. 405; Peoria v. General Elec. 
CabUvision Corp. 690 F.2d 116, 121 (7th 
Cir.1982). Although 47 U.S.C. sec. 405 
specifies that a petition for reconsideration 
must be filed within thirty days of the 
Commission's decision, this provision has 
been interpreted merely to provide the 
Commission with a "fair opportunity" to 
1. I note in passing that the Supreme Court re-
cently sustained the FCCs authority to issue 
regulations preempting local cable regulation 
enacted in the wake of the Cable Act's passage. 
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consider the issues. Meredith Corp. v. 
FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C.Cir.1987); Peoria, 
supra, 690 F.2d at 119. Thus defendant 
may raise his arguments before the com-
mission in a motion for a declaratory judg-
ment, 47 C.F.R. sec. 1.2, or in a petition for 
repeal of the Order, 47 C.F.R. sec. 1.401. 
Judicial review may only then be sought 
from the Court of Appeals. 47 U.S.C. 
405(a); 28 U.S.C. sec. 2342(1). In the inter-
ests of judicial economy, I will assume 
without deciding that the Order was a valid 
exercise of authority by the Commission 
and proceed on to the balance of the pre-
emption analysis.1 
The preemption issue presented here is 
unusual because the federal regulation it-
self establishes standards that govern 
whether and to what degree the local regu-
lation is preempted. 
The threshold determination under the 
Order is whether the challenged regulation 
differentiates between TVRO's and other 
types of antenna facilities. The Ordinance 
clearly applies to "dish antennae . . . or 
satellite receiving stationfs]." Ordinance 
sec. 2.1. It differentiates between TVRO 
antennas and transmitting dish antennas 
by forbidding the use of the latter entirely. 
Id. at sec. 2.3. The Ordinance does not 
apply to UHF and VHF television, FM ra-
dio, or ham and short-wave radio antennas. 
Thus the Ordinance effectively discrimi-
nates between different types of antennas. 
[11] The Order next provides that in 
order to avoid preemption, the local regula-
tion must have a reasonable, clearly de-
fined health, safety or aesthetic objective. 
The Ordinance passes this test. Satellite 
dish antennas are large and rather unsight-
ly. Although it does not state its purposes 
explicitly, the Ordinance is clearly an at-
tempt to diminish the visual impact of the 
antennas by requiring that they be install-
ed in the rear yard and, where they can be 
viewed from the street or adjoining proper-
ties, requiring that the installation be 
screened with tail shrubbery. Some safety 
Sew York v. FCC, U.S. . 10S S.CL 1637. 
100 L.Ed.2d 48 (1988). The Court did not di-
rectly consider the FCC Order in question, how-
ever. 
AA-6 
1030 696 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
purposes might also be achieved by pre-
venting dish antenna roof placement and 
by establishing height limitations in order 
to avoid the hazards of a fallen or wind-
blown antenna. 
Finally, the Ordinance also must not pre-
vent or impose unreasonable limitations on 
reception or impose costs on the user dis-
proportionate to his total investment in an-
tenna equipment and installation. In order 
to make this evaluation I must first digress 
to consider how satellite television signals 
are received I draw this explanation from 
the undisputed affidavit submitted by 
plaintiffs' TVRO vendor and installer, the 
article submitted by defendant, Harry B 
Roth, Regulating Satellite Dish Antennas, 
American Planning Association, Planning 
Advisory Service Report No 394, and the 
discussion accompanying the release of the 
FCC Order at 51 Fed Reg. 5519 (1986) et 
seq 
Nineteen satellites in geostationary orbit 
22,300 miles above the equator broadcast 
programming services that can be received 
only by TVRO antennas These ''television 
satellites" are located above the eastern 
Pacific and are spaced four degrees apart 
from each other The TVRO remains in a 
fixed position to receive signals from a 
given satellite but is mounted on an electric 
rotor that permits it to be realigned to 
receive signals from the other satellites as 
required 
In order for the TVRO antenna to re-
ceive satellite signals, there must be a clear 
line of sight between the satellite and the 
dish antenna. Dense obstructions such as 
buildings, trees and shrubbery interfere 
with or prohibit reception The range of 
unobstructed positions an antenna must 
have to "view" the satellites and receive 
signals is called a deception window ' or 
"look angle ' This angle is expressed in 
terms of two dimensions The azimuth 
alignment, expressed in degrees from true 
North, refers to the horizontal direction the 
antenna must be directed Since there are 
a number of television satellites, this is 
expressed as a range The elevation align-
ment refers to the vertical orientation, 
usually expressed in degrees above the ho-
rizon. In northern New Jersey, a look 
angle with an azimuth alignment of 69 to 
143 degrees West and an elevation align-
ment of 14 degrees above the horizon is 
required to receive signals from the tele-
vision satellites. 
Because satellite-transmitted television 
signals are relatively weak, the dish anten-
nas must be at least ten feet in length in 
this area of the country in order to receive 
transmissions. 
[12] Plaintiffs do not claim that a rear-
lot installation would completely preclude 
all satellite reception; they claim, rather, 
that they can receive "all" of the available 
signals only by mounting the dish antenna 
on the roof of their house. The FCC Order 
does not require the Ordinance to permit 
optimal placement, it precludes only "un-
reasonable" interference with satellite sig-
nal reception It is unclear whether plain-
tiffs inability to receive "all" of the satel-
lite signals includes channels which are en-
crypted or which the plaintiffs are not oth-
erwise authorized to receive. Construing 
all facts m the light moat favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment, I can-
not conclude, on the basis of this assertion 
alone, that the regulation imposes an un-
reasonable burden on plaintiffs. 
It is clear, however, that the Ordinance 
functions as an unreasonable burden on 
reception because its provisions make re-
ception technically impossible and because 
it is generally insensitive to the unique 
conditions that govern signal reception on 
any given site 
Although defendant does not dispute 
that a ten foot wide dish antenna is the 
smallest size capable of receiving television 
satellite reception in this area, the Ordi-
nance makes reception technically impossi-
ble by limiting the maximum height of any 
part of the antenna installation to six feet. 
A ten-foot wide dish antenna angled at the 
required fourteen degree elevation, would 
clearly exceed this limitation. 
The Ordinance is also insensitive to the 
unique conditions that govern reception on 
any given lot. The Ordinance requires the 
antenna to be "screened from view from 
adjoining properties and streets by ever-
VAN METER v.*fb\VNSHIP OF MAPLEWOOD 
CU««**96 F.Supp 1024 (D N J . 1988) 1031 
green planting at least six feet in 
height at the time of planting " Ordinance 
sec, 3 1. This standard is unreasonable 
because it is insensitive to the impact of 
shielding on an antenna's reception win-
dow. While vegetation surrounding a sat 
ellite installation can actually help improve 
reception by absorbing interfering signals, 
it can impair or limit reception if it ob-
structs the antenna's line of sight. If the 
orientation of a specific lot requires a look 
angle directed toward a rear-adjoining lot, 
for example, the antenna would have to be 
placed over ten feet behind the required 
six-foot high evergreen screening, assum-
ing a fourteen degree elevation azimuth, in 
order to gain a clear 'View" over the ob-
stacle. Given the configuration of some 
lots, this might well limit or completely 
prevent reception This type of regulation 
was specifically disapproved by the FCC in 
the statements accompanying its Order 
51 Fed Reg 5519, 5524 (1986) ("[An ordi-
nance] cannot unreasonably limit or pre-
vent reception by requiring, for example, 
that a receive-only antenna be screened so 
that line of sight is obscured ") 
In addition, if there were lots on either 
side of the rear yard, the TVRO user would 
also have to shield the antenna from view 
by the adjoining properties by planting 
evergreen shielding on both sides Thus, a 
homeowner might have to plant thirty feet 
of hedgerows six feet tall to comply with 
the ordinance at a cost that could easily 
exceed the initial investment in satellite 
television reception equipment 
The Ordinance also unreasonably re-
stricts reception by failing to provide op-
tions for alternative placement to TVRO 
users who cannot receive signals or who 
would receive only diminished reception 
through rear lot installation While roof 
mounting poses obvious aesthetic and safe-
ty problems, a per se prohibition of roof 
installations, especially where the commu-
nity interests in appearance and safety can 
be satisfied at least in part, is an unreason-
able limitation on reception within the 
meaning of the Order 
(131 Defendant's proposed solution to 
the antenna height limitation, which it con 
cedes to be an unreasonable limitation of 
reception, is to allow TVRO users who can-
not achieve reception within the constraints 
imposed by the Ordinance to apply to the 
Board of Adjustment for a zoning variance. 
(This would presumably also be its re-
sponse to the other unreasonable limita-
tions I have found the statute imposes 
upon reception) The defendant claims that 
this scheme would effectively enable the 
Board to apply the Ordinance in an individ-
ualized manner 
This scheme is unsatisfactory for several 
reasons First, while the concept of mdi-" 
viduahzed treatment may be a worthy one, 
variances from this Ordinance do not pro-
vide an effective means of achieving this 
objective A variance from a zoning ordi-
nance is permitted only if "without sub-
stantial detriment to the public good" and 
if it "will not substantially impair the in-
tent and the purpose of the zone plan and 
zoning ordinance " N J S A sec. 40 55D-
70 Apart from the very real question of 
whether any variance from the challenged 
Ordinance would remain consistent with its 
specific purposes, this scheme is objectiona-
ble because it does not include reasonable 
satellite television signal reception as a 
factor m the evaluation but considers only 
the purposes of the ordinance and the 
"public good" 
Second, permitting the Board effect-vely 
to regulate TVRO antenna placement by 
granting variances from an invalidated or-
dinance would allow the Board to exercise 
authority without bounds No standards 
for antenna placement would exist to guide 
the decisions of the Board, to apprise 
TVRO users of permitted placement sites, 
or to provide a meaningful standard for 
review of the Board's decisions Nor could 
the Board be guided directly by the FCC 
Order since it was intended as a standard 
for the preemption of local regulation not 
a model zoning ordinance Permitting the 
Board to regulate TVRO use in this man-
ner would also increase the likelihood of 
judicial intervention in a traditionally local 
function, something that I would think that 
the defendant would be loathe to encour-
age 
1032 696 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
Finally, the variance procedure, requir 
mg TVRO antenna users to make an appli-
cation for hearing, publish notice, serve 
notice of publication and make a presenta-
tion at a public meeting, imposes burdens 
other antenna users are not required to 
bear and is therefore discriminatory within 
the meaning of the Order Since the pro-
cess is not governed by consistent, objec-
tive standards, this variance process would 
represent an unreasonable limitation on re-
ception 
I am not unsympathetic to the difficult 
task faced by municipalities that seek to 
regelate dish antenna use in balancing the 
community's aesthetic and safety interests 
with the individual's interest in receiving 
information transmitted through satellite 
television signals The FCC, however, has 
determined that when the community and 
individual interests conflict in this context, 
the interests of the individual and the na-
tional interest require that the balance be 
tipped in favor of permitting individual sat-
ellite television reception The task of 
ronioning appropriate legislation in light 
of this mandate is not a simple one, but 
municipalities can enact regulation consist-
ent with the Order by regulating the use of 
all antennas evenhandedly, without impos-
ing special burdens on TVRO dish antenna 
users, or by ensuring that their regulations 
do not make reception technically impossi-
ble and are flexible enough to account for 
the unique reception requirements of the 
individual lots within their boundaries 
Conclusion 
For the reasons above, I conclude that, 
assuming that the FCC had authority to 
issue the Order, the Maplewood Ordinance 
is preempted by 47 CFR 25.201. I thus 
need not reach plaintiffs' constitutional 
claims. 
If the FCC Order is valid plaintiffs would 
be entitled to summary judgment declaring 
the Ordinance invalid, enjoining its enforce-
ment and awarding plaintiffs attorney's 
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C sec. 1988 It 
would follow that defendant's motion to 
dismiss the preemption claim and for fail-
ure to apply for a variance should be de-
nied on the merits and that defendant's 
motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 should be 
dismissed as moot. 
However, defendant challenges the valid-
ity of the FCC Order, an issue I do not 
have jurisdiction to decide. If within 45 
days of October 11, 1988 defendant com-
mences a proceeding challenging the Order 
before the FCC and thereafter actively 
prosecutes the proceeding, and if defendant 
stays prosecution of plaintiffs and enforce-
ment of the Ordinance against them, I shall 
defer entering summary judgment against 
defendant at this time and shall stay pro-
ceedings in this case until final disposition 
of the proceeding challenging the validity 
of the FCC Order Otherwise summary 
judgment will be entered as described 
above Defendant should advise me by 
October 31, 1988 what course of action it 
proposes to take. 
APPENDIX 
MAPLEWOOD DISH ANTENNAE 
ZONING ORDINANCE 
There is hereby adopted an ordinance regu-
lating the construction, placement, and use 
of dish antennae within the Township of 
Maplewood and supplementing and amend-
ing the zoning ordinance of the Township 
of Maplewood regarding Accessory Build-
ing and Structures 
SECTION 1 ACCESSORY BUILDINGS 
AND STRUCTURES 
Section 1 1 An accessory building attached 
to a principal building is considered part 
of the principal building and shall adhere 
to the yard requirements for the princi-
pal building 
Section 1.2. The distance from an accesso-
ry building to a principal building shall 
not be less than 10 feet nor less than 6 
feet from another accessory building or a 
property line 
Section 1 3: The distance from an accesso-
ry building to a side property line shall 
not be less than the side yard require-
ments of the principal budding. 
SECTION 2. DISH ANTENNAE 
Section 2 1. A receiving dish antennae (or 
satellite receiving station) shall be con-
sidered an accessory structure. 
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Section 2.2: A receiving dish antennae 
shall be no more than 6 feet in height 
measured at the highest point of its out-
er circumference or any extension, in-
cluding the supporting structure. It 
shall be located in the rear yard only. 
On corner lots, which have no defined 
rear yard, it shall be located in a side 
yard a minimum of two times the re-
quired front setback from the street line 
measured at its closest point on its cir-
cumference, a t any extension or to its 
supporting structure, ^whichever is clos-
es t . 
Section 2.3: A transmitting dish antennae 
is not a permitted use. 
SECTION 3. B U F F E R S FOR DISH AN-
T E N N A E 
Section 3.1 A dish antennae [sic] shall be 
screened from view from adjoining prop-
erties and streets by evergreen planting, 
which shall be at least six feet in height 
at the time of planting. 
ELI L I L L Y A N D COMPANY, Plaintiff", 
v. 
M E D T R O N I C , INC., Defendant . 
Civ. A. No . 83-5393. 
United States District Court, 
E.D. Pennsylvania. 
April 21, 1988. 
Owner of patents disclosing ventricu-
lar defibrillation devices brought infringe-
ment action. On issue of whether patents 
were unenforceable for inequitable conduct 
before Patent and Trademark Office, the 
District Court, Ditter, J., held that alleged 
infringer failed to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that inventors or their 
counsel were guilty of any intentional or 
I. Dr. Michel Mtrowski is the inventor of the 757 
patent. Dr. Mirowski, Dr. Morton Mower, and 
v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 1 0 3 3 
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even grossly negligent withholding of any 
material information from PTO. 
Judgment for plaintiff. 
Patents *=>312(6) 
Alleged infringer failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that inven-
tors or their counsel were guilty of any 
intentional or even grossly negl igent with-
holding of any material information before 
Patent and Trademark Office during prose-
cution or reexamination of patents disclos-
ing ventricular defibrillation devices and, 
thus, patents were not invalid for ineq-
uitable conduct before PTO. 
Timothy J. Malloy, Lawrence M. Jarvis, 
Gregory J. Vogler, Chicago, 111., Richard G. 
Schneider, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff 
Philip S Johnson, Albert W Preston, 
John J Mackiewicz, Gary H. Levin, Phila-
delphia, Pa., for defendant. 
MEMORANDUM A N D ORDER 
DITTER, District Judge. 
Plaintiff Eh Lilly and Company brought 
this suit against defendant Medtronic, Inc. 
alleging infnngement by Medtronic of two 
United States patents, No. Re 27,757, reex-
amined and issued as Bl Re. 27,757 (the 757 
patent) and No. 3,942,536, reexamined and 
issued as Bl 3,942,536 (the 536 patent). At 
the close of Medtronic's case, with the 
agreement of the parties. I granted Lilly's 
motion for a directed verdict with regard to 
the validity of the 536 patent and its in-
fnngement by Medtronic's Model 7210 and 
its associated leads. The jury subsequent-
ly returned a verdict in favor of Lilly, hav-
ing found Medtronic's devices to infringe 
the claims of the 757 patent. The jury also 
decided that Medtronic's infringement of 
the 757 and 536 patents was willful. The 
parties agreed to submit for my determina-
tion the issue as to whether the alleged 
inequitable conduct of the patents' inven-
tors,1 Dr. Michel Mirowski and Dr. Morton 
Rollin H. Denniston. a Medtronic engineer, are 
listed as the inventors of the 536 patent. 
A A - 1 0 
APPENDIX 
ADDENDUM "BB 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
one showing it behind the satellite, and this one showing it 
from a side view, I think, with at least one of the 
extensions? 
A Yes, they are. 
Q Okay. I'd ask you to note specifically, well, in 
both Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, you 
testified earlier—for my clarification, you indicated that 
the only portion of the house that was brick was the chimney; 
does this not indicate an entire side that's brick, and 
also a front facing that's brick? 
A No. That's imitation. 
Q Oh, that's imitation— 
A Imitation. 
Q —brick? 
A I think it's made of tar product of some kind. 
Q Okay. Now, you've indicated that you had no other 
alternative for the placing of your satellite dish; isn't it 
true that the City has advised you that you could apply for a 
variance? 
A In that—can I respond to that? 
Q Well, yes, I would like a response, preferably with 
a yes or a no. Has the City— 
MR. BYBEE: I would object to a yes or no, your 
Honor, if he requires more— 
THE WITNESS: Do you want just a yes or a no? 
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THE COURT: No. You may respond. 
THE WITNESS: Could I tell what happened, leading 
up to it? 
Q (By Mr. Hamp) Well, my question is, has—let me 
rephrase the question. Maybe this will make it easier. 
Have you ever applied for a variance? 
A No. t went down and talked to them. 
Q Okay. And they've told you that you could apply 
for a variance, is that not correct? 
A Well, it—at the point that we're here, but not at 
the initial point. Okay. This is—this is over a period of 
time, 
Q All right. So, you could have—during this period, 
you could have—we're now six months down the line. 
A They told me at the first time I talked to them 
that they hadn't granted any variances. 
Q Okay. But they didn't tell you they wouldn't 
grant yours necessarily, did they? 
A The—in effect, what I'm saying is, yes, there 
w a s — 
Q You've never really applied for it to find out; 
isn't that correct? 
A Well, actually, as I recall that conversation, 
which you're not asking me about, they said if I didn't get 
a variance, they would take away my business license also, 
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1 and that's what happened in that conversation. That, to me, 
2 is extortion, you didn't ask me that, but that's what that 
3 conversation was all about. 
4 Q Those people arenft here that were during that 
5 conversation, and they can't provide i t — 
6 A Well, Craig is here. 
7 J Q It's not relevant. 
A Craig is here. 
Q And i t — 
A It may not be relevant to you, but it is relevant 
to me. If someone tells me that something that's never 
been granted, they'll give me a — 
MR. HAMP: Your Honor, if I may request an 
instruction from the Court to the witness to answer what 
I'm asking about. We keep on getting into all these extra 
issues that are not before the Court. 
THE COURT: Well, but your questions are not 
specific, Mr. Hamp. Ask a specific question and I'll 
instruct him to answer specifically. 
Q (By Mr. Hamp) Isn't it your understanding that if 
a variance were granted to you, that that would allow your 
satellite dish to be exactly in the spot where it is at? 
A Yes. That's clear to me. 
Q Okay. 
A It's—it may be t h a t — 
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THE COURT: Just answer the question, sir. 
THE WITNESS: It may not be there also, because 
they may grant the variance to put it someplace else, s o -
so it's not clear to me that it would be in that exact same— 
it may or may not be there; depends on where they grant the 
variance to put it. 
Q (By Mr. Hamp) Okay. But there is a possibility 
that it could be there? 
A Yeah. There's a possibility it could be there. 
Q Hasn't the—and hasn't the City also indicated that 
due to the fact that you don't have a back yard, that a 
variance may well be granted? 
A No, not up 'til this moment. 
MR. HAMP: I have nothing further for this witness, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bybee, any redirect? 
MR. BYBEE: No. Nothing, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. You may step down. 
If you'll have a seat at the table again. 
MR. BYBEE: We have no other witnesses, your Honor.' 
THE COURT: Any rebuttal witnesses? 
MR. HAMP: Briefly, your Honor. We would call 
Mr. Spangenberg again. 
THE COURT: Mr. Spangenberg, you're still under 
oath. If you'll take the stand, please. 
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•urtrrxvcrn—c. x u i l iTJftlAfl 
423 7th Avenue /On, / -~, 
Sa l t Lake Ci ty , Utah (~OrJ &F LifTT&Z. 
April 14, 1989 /^/W? D&JV&ZGO 
State of Utah ~7Z> JifFF&iy O- Jo/ti/S<» &/v /b?/zil /y, /$f9 
s 
Department of Administrative Services 
Utah State Archives and Records Service 
Archives Building State Capitol zZy- /?'///? tf A/ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 ° '" A'/7* 
MR. Jeffery 0. Johnson: 
When I was at the research center on April 10, 1989, I informed 
you that I could not find the Oath of Office Certificates for 
Norman H. Bangerter, W. Val Oveson, R. Paul Van Dam, Tom L. 
Allen and Edward T. Alter for 1989. I also informed you that 
I could not find in the same file any of the Oath of Office 
Certificates for any of the members of the 1989 Utah Legislature. 
I reported the absence of those records to Kathy Pickering who 
spoke to Gordon R. Hall and Mr. Butler about their not being 
on file at the Archives, I also reported it to David Hansen, 
KSL, KTVX, Associated Press, The Deseret News, and the Sheriff's 
office the same afternoon I met with you, Val Wilson and 
^ Christie. 
Y As you suggested I am writing you for a written response to 
this serious matter. Utah law provides that the Oath of Office 
Vshall be filed in the Department of Archives. Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as Amendedr^S^EtzB' saYs that all state officers 
shall file their oath of office in the Department of Archives. 
> Utah Code Annptated£51*2-T) requires that to be done within sixty 
\ J days or the office shall be declared vacant. 
s* I was informed by Mr. Val Wilson at the research center that 
the oaths of office not on file on April 10, 1989 in the Depart-
ment of Archives for the five executive officers named above 
were delivered to the Archives Department on April 11, 1989. 
Christie told me that she received a hand full of Oath of Office 
Certificates from a man she did not know on Tuesday, April 11, 
1989, and that among them were the ones for Governor and Lt. 
Governor among others she was unable to verify when I talked 
to her on the morning of Wednesday, April 12, 1989. 
Under provisions of the Utah Criminal Code it is unlawful to 
act in any public office without filing the required oath of 
office. Utah Code Annotated 76-8-203 states the nature of the 
offense. I would ask you to verify immediately in writing the 
time, date and place those five Oath of Office Certificates 
were filed and by whom they were delivered and received. A 
Court document was filed on April 12, 1989 concerning the failure 
to file the oaths of office for the five state executive 
officers, your verification is needed. I would also ask you 
to verify the presence or absence of the oaths of office certifi-
cates for the members of the Utah Legislature and the time, 
date and place of filing, and by whom delivered and by whom 
received« 
dsLc^lx ^CCL^/^-^-^^^J^MU 
Is the state's 
top officeholder 
really official? 
Gov. Norm Bangerter SMPag*B1 
Elected officials 
aren't official, 
activist says 
IT By Jay Evensen Deseret News staff writer 
Just when state officials were getting used 
to the jobs they were elected to last year, 
along comes an activist who tells them they 
really aren't in office. 
Lawrence Topham. a constitutionalist who 
once paid a candidate filing fee with silver 
dollars worth far more than their face value, 
says every state officeholder in Utah has bro-
ken the law by failing to file an oath of office 
with the State Archives Division. 
Topham, who once ran for governor as an 
American Party candidate but was ousted 
from that party after an internal dispute last 
year, is linking that law with another one re-
quiring elected officials to qualify for their 
offices within 60 days of the start of their 
terms. 
In letters delivered to state officials this 
week, he says every elected official, including 
the governor, is no longer in office. 
Saturday, April 15,1989 
TOPHAM 
Continued from B1 
State officials acted puzzled Fri-
day when confronted with the 
claims. 
"The governor took the oath of of-
fice in January... Remember?" said 
Bud Scruggs, chief of staff to Gov. 
Norm Bangerter. 
Jeffery Johnson, state archives di-
rector, said he believes the law re-
quires oaths of office to be filed only 
for historical purposes. That law 
does not include a time limit, he said. 
But, since Topham began his cru-
sade last week, all the oaths of office 
from January have been placed on 
file, Johnson said. 
Meanwhile, state officials say the 
public should rest assured that gov-
ernment is functioning normally and 
that the results of November's elec-
tion still stand. 
"We have a video tape of the 
swearing-in ceremony; the best proof 
you-could have," said Lt. Gov. Val 
Oveson. 
ITYHTRTT "CC-7" 
Vefft He. JO^AJSCVO 
Of tirie sz. THTE RittiiGuoes SHOULD tifft£ 
b&su SZ-i-z /fad S^-A-/ hlcn- S*i-\-xfoil> 
0FT1CIAL OATHS AND BONDS 5 2 - M 
52-1-2. Bonds to state -— Approval and recording — Filing 
of oaths. 
Whenever state officers, officials of state institutions, or other persons, are 
required to give official bonds to the state, the bonds, unless othermse pro-
vided shall be approved by the Division of Finance, and recorded by the state 
treasurer in a book kept for that purpose. The oaths of office of all state 
officials shall be filed with the Division of Archives. 
CHAPTER 2 
FAILURE TO QUALIFY FOR OFFICE 
Section 
62-2-1. Tim* in which to qualify — Failure 
— Office declared vacant 
52-2-1. Time in which to qualify — Failure — Office de-
clared vacant 
Whenever any person duly elected or appointed to any office of the state or 
any of its political subdivisions, fails to qualify for such office within sixty 
days after the date of beginning of the term of office for which he was elected 
or appointed, such office shall thereupon become vacant and shall be filled as 
provided by law. Whenever the bond of any officer of the state or of any of its 
political subdivisions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise becomes 
void or of no effect, without another proper bond being given so that contin-
uance of bonded protection is afforded, the office of such officer shall there-
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PART 2 
ABUSE OF OFFICE 
Section 
76-8-201. Official misconduct — Unauthorized 
acts or failure of duty. 
76-8-202. Official misconduct — Unlawful acts 
based on "inside** information. 
76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct. 
76-8-201. Official misconduct — Unauthorized 
acts or failure of duty. 
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
if with an intent to benefit himself or another or to 
harm another, he knowingly commits an unautho-
rized act which purport* to be an act of his office, or 
knowingly refrains from performing a duty imposed 
on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his 
office.
 i r 3 
76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct 
(1) A person is guilty of unofficial misconduct if he 
exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions 
of a public office when: 
(a) He has not taken and filed the required 
oath of office; or 
(b) He has failed to execute and file the re-
quired bond; or 
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to of-
fice; or 
(d) He exercises any of the functions of his of-
fice after his term has expired and the successor 
has been elected or appointed and has qualified, 
or after fiis office has been legally removed. 
(e) He knowingly withholds or retains from his 
successor in office or other person entitled to the 
official seal or any records, papers, documents, or 
other writings appertaining or belonging to his 
office or mutilates or destroys or takes away the 
same. 
(2) Unofficial mi conduct i* a CUM B miide-
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Jeffery O. Johnson 
Director 
State of Utah 
Department of Administrative Services 
Division of Archives & Records Service 
State Capitol Archives Building 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114 
(801)538-3012 
April 17, 1989 
Lawrence Rey Topham 
423 7th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Dear Mr. Topham: 
In answer to your letter of April 14, the State Archives received the Oath of 
Office Certificates for Tom L. Allen, State Auditor; Edward T. Alter, State 
Treasure; R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General; W. Val Oveson, Lt. Governor; and 
Norman H. Bangerter, Governor on April 11. They are all dated January 2, 1989 
and signed by Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice of the Utah Supreme Court. We 
have not received the Oaths from the 1989 Legislature. 
If we can be of further service to you, please let us know. 
Sincerely, 
Jeffe 
c. David D. Hansen, Lt. Governor's Office 
c. Kirk Waldron 
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BC-Oath Dispute,500 
Conservative Activist Says Governor* Officials Violated Statute 
By MICHAEL WHITE 
Associated Press Uriter 
SALT LAKE CITY <AP) - A conservative activist believes Gov* Norm Bangerter 
and other top state officials* including tne entire Legislature* have forfeited 
their right to office by overlooking an obscure bit of paper work 4 
Lawrence Topham* a former American Party candidate for governor* contends 
that by failing to promptly file oaths of office with the Division of Archives* 
most of the state's top elective offices must be vacated* 
State officials say it's true that the oaths were not filed according to 
the statutory requirements* but they say it's unlikely the oversight will 
topple the Bangerter administration* 
XNThe important thing is the people who were elected to office took the 
oath of office* There was a swearing in* There was an inauguration ceremony* 
said Deputy Lt* Gov. Dave Hansen* who supervises state elections* 
Topham contends that the failure to comply with the statute signifies a 
general governmental disregard for law* 
XNUe think this is not just a light matter* " said Topham* XNThe whole 
nation has become corrupted and the corruption is so pervasive* things are that 
they don't feel (this requirement) needs to be taken care of* But the question 
is* are they really in office?'' 
One state statute* section 52-1-2 of the Utah Code* requires that elected 
officials to file a signed oath with the Archives Division* Topham links this 
to section 52-2-1* which states that if a candidate fails to qualify within 60 
days* the office shall be declared vacant* 
Topham contends that by failing to file the oaths within the time period* 
the offices of governor* lieutenant governor* attorney general* auditor* 
treasurer* several Supreme Court justice seats and most seats in the 
Legislature should be declared vacant* 
Topham said those who did not file also violated section 76-8-201* which 
declares that an officehglder is guilty of unofficial misconduct* a class B 
misdemeanor* if he or she fails to take and file the required oath of office* 
Finally* Topham argues that because oaths for the state's top rive elected 
officials - the governor* lieutenant governor* attorney general* auditor and 
treasurer - were signed after the 60-day period* but dated Jan* 2* the day 
officeholders were sworn in* officials are guilty of falsifying documenrbs* 
But Hansen said the form requires the date of the swearing in* not the date 
the forms were signed* 
vxThat's what it asks for*'' Hansen said* 
A long-time activist and self-styled constitutionalist* Topham has bee^ a 
familiar figure in Utah political circles* In 1?88 he filed an action forcing 
the American Party to drop a registration fee tor delegates to its state 
convention* He argued that the party was charging delegates for the right to 
vote • 
An advocate of a return to the silver standard* he does not consider U*S* 
currency to be legal tender avid refuses to accept it as pay or use it* He once 
used silver dollars to pay a candidacy filing fee* even though the coins were 
worth far more than the dollar amount of the fee* 
He said he refuses to conduct any transaction that would require him to use 
notes that are not backed by precious n>etal* 
(MORE) 
SLUG: AEOII71? PAGE: 2 
Topham said he plans to file a legal complaint over the failure to file the 
oaths* but worries he may not be able to find a judge who is not affected by 
the oath situation* 
Since apparently no member of the state Senate filed his oath* and judicial 
appointees are confirmed by the Senate* he believes many judgeships also would 
be declared vacant if he can prove his case* 
STATE OF UTAH 
N O R M A N H. B A N G E R T E R O F F I C E OF THE G O V E R N O R 
G O V E R N O R S A L T L A K E C ITY 
8 4 1 1 4 
May 15, 1989 
Lawrence Rey Topham 
423 7th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Dear Larry: 
Your recent inquiry to the Governor's Chief of Staff, Mr. 
H. E. Scruggs, has been referred to me for comment. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 52-2-1 simply states 
that "any person duly elected" who "fails to qualify for such 
office within 60 days after the date of beginning of the term 
of office for which he was elected or appointed, such office 
shall there upon become vacant and shall be filled as provided 
by law." Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 52-1-2 simply 
requires that "the Oaths of Office of all state officials shall 
be filed with a Division of Archives," 
It is quite clear that the filing of the Oath of Office is 
a formality required for historical purposes and is not a 
condition of qualification. I am informed that an informal 
Attorney General's opinion verifies that position. 
Your activism and intent of scholarship is commendable; 
however, in this case, as stated above I believe a faulty 
interpretation of the two paragraphs have been made. 
Sincerely, 
e^tfglas <$5. Bischoff 
Deputy Chief of Staff 
DGB/rw Nw-^ 
EXHIBIT "CC-7" 
APPENDIX 
ADDENDUM "DD 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH CIRCUIT COURTS, INCLUDING TRIAL 
COURT, AND THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND ARE UNAUTHORIZED 
BY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LACK JURISDICTION 
AND LACK ALL LAWFUL JUDICIAL POWER TO ACT, 
AND HAVE AND ARE NOW DENYING DUE PROCESS. 
The question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time. 
Utah Const., Art I, Sees. 7 and 15; Art IV, Sec. 10. Utah 
Code Ann., Sees. 25-5-4, 52-1-2, 52-2-1, 76-1-301, 76-8-203 
61-1-1; 76-10-1602 and 1603. U.S Const., Art I, Sees. 8, 9, 
and 10; Art VI; Art. VII; 1 Stat 23 and 246; 18 USCA 2-8, 
241, 242, 331-334, 371, 471-473, 892-894, 1341, 1962-1965. 
The question of jurisdiction is raised in this case based on 
the fact that the persons elected to the Utah Senate, the 
Utah House of Representatives, to the executive offices of 
Governor of Utah, Lieutenant Governor of Utah, Utah State 
Auditor, Utah State Treasurer, Utah Attorney General, and 
three of the persons elected to become justices of the Utah 
Supreme Court, all failed to file the Constitutionally and 
statutorily required oath of office certificates in 1987 and 
in 1989, before entering the duties of those respective 
offices, and by failing to file their oaths of office they 
did not acquire the power to act as public officials 
following their elections to office and by failing to take, 
subscribe and file their respective oaths of office within 
sixty days after the beginning of their respective terms, 
the offices all became vacant as a matter of law and all of 
their exercise or attempted exercise as public servants of 
the functions of public office constituted unofficial 
misconduct. Their acts of office performed while they were 
not officially in office are all unconstitutional, unlawful, 
null and void. As a result of the failure of these elected 
public servants and the fact that the persons elected to the 
Utah Senate have failed to take, subscribe and file the 
required oath of office for the past fourteen and one half 
years, according to the official records on deposit in the 
Utah Division of Archives, all legislation and appointments 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate were 
unconstitutional, unlawful, unofficial, criminal and void. 
This includes the unofficial acts of creating the Utah 
Circuit Courts and the Utah Court of Appeals, and 
appointments made thereto, as well as appointments to the 
Supreme Court from 1975 until June 30, 1989. Mr. Palmer has 
personally searched the records at the Utah Division of 
Archives and has personal knowledge of persons in and out of 
government who researched the records, contacted the 
personnel in the office of the clerk of the Supreme court 
to inquire where the required oaths of office were for 
Gordon R. Hall, I. Daniel Stewart and Michael D. Zimmerman 
whose oaths were not in the archives on the 20th day of 
March 1989, more than sixty days after the terms of office 
began for 1989 and more than two years and sixty days after 
Gordon R. Hall's term of office began on January 7, 1987, 
so that Gordon R. Hall was not a public official on the Utah 
Supreme Court at the time he unofficially acted in that 
office on January 2, 1989, at the inauguration ceremony for 
the seven elected persons who failed to file their oaths 
following that unofficial ceremony. After persons in the 
Supreme Court clerkfs office were contacted and told the 3 
justice's oaths were not filed, as of the 20th day of March, 
1989, false oaths were fraudulently made out, backdated, 
signed, and delivered to the Utah Division of Archives 
between March 20, 1989 and April 10, 1989. On April 11, 
1989, one day after persons in the Supreme Court Clerk's 
office, including the clerk, and persons in the Lieutenant 
Governorfs office, including the deputy "Lt. Governor", were 
notified that the oaths of office were not on file for the 
five executive officers, and that the offices were vacant, 
because the five persons had not qualified for office 
following their elections, those oaths were also falsely 
made, backdated, subscribed and filed on the 11th day of 
April, 1989, ninty nine days after the term of office began. 
Their failure to file their oaths was reported to the Salt 
County Sherriff's office, KSL Television, KTVX Television, 
the Deseret News, and the Associated Press on the 10th day 
of April, 1989. The matter was treated very lightly, until 
written letters and copies of the Utah Statutes were taken 
to the same offices and, finally, The Deseret News published 
an article which began on the front page on April 15, 1989. 
The article showed a picture of Norman H. Bangerter, and 
asked, "Is the state's top officeholder really official?" 
On April 19, 1989, the Associated Press released a wire 
story on the same subject which indicated that the deputy 
Lieutenant Governor admitted that they backdated the oaths. 
On June 12, 1989, KSL Television presented a six and a half 
minute story involving the failure of the legislative, 
executive and judicial officers to file their oaths of 
office as required by law. The matter was also reported to 
the Salt Lake County Attorney's office to the chief of the 
justice division in a 12 page sworn notarized statement on 
the 18th day of April, 1989, and to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation because Utah no longer has a republican form 
of Government as guaranteed to the people of Utah by the 
Constitution of the United States of America. There are no 
public officials of the State of Utah to resolve the matter 
and the "federal Government" has a vested interest in not 
resolving the problem. The matter was taken to the "Circuit 
Court Judge" who was assigned to receive criminal complaints 
on April 18, 1989, but Paul G. Grant, refused to even look 
at the 12 page sworn notarized statement made that day in 
the Utah Division of Archives after a search had been made 
again for the oaths of office for the members of the Utah 
Legislature for the years 1987 and 1989, and for the elected 
members of the Senate back to 1983. No oaths of office were 
found for all of those years for the Senate. Copies of the 
false oaths of office of Norman H. Bangerter, W. Val Oveson, 
Tom L. Allen, Edward T. Alter, R. Paul Van Dam, I. Daniel, 
Stewart and Michael D. Zimmerman, were delivered to the FBI 
with a copy of the complaint that was given to Walter 
Ellett, who said he was the chief of the Justice Division, 
On May 26, 1989, David Yocum, Walter Ellett, Norman D. 
Hayward and a number of people met in the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's office where these people were all told by David 
Yocum and Mr. Ellett that they were not going to do anything 
about the failure of the legislative, and the executive, and 
the judicial, elected public servants, to file the required 
oaths of office or for falsifying of the sworn statements by 
those men unlawfully impersonating executive and judicial 
officers in the Executive Department and the Judicial 
Department of the government of the State of Utah. 
What the defendant is learning about government in Utah 
and in the United States is that those persons elected and 
appointed to public office can not be trusted, no matter 
what office they were elected or appointed to fill. Even 
their oath of office is not important and falsifying it is 
just routine by the Supreme Court's chief "Justice" and by 
the other executive and judicial "officers" who work with or 
aid and abet him, so they can collect all that false paper 
security. But this all leads to one clear conclusion. The 
Circuit Courts in Utah and the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
Utah Supreme Court have lost all legitimate claim to lawful 
and Constitutional jurisdiction, and Mr. Palmer has been 
denied due process of law for numerous reasons. Utah Code 
Ann. 76-8-203. The functions in every department of Utah 
State government are unofficial, unconstitutional and void, 
and criminal (Appellant's exhibits in Addendum "CC") 
Point II. 
EVERY PERSON HAS AN INALIENABLE RIGHT 
TO LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF 
HAPPINESS AND TO EXERCISE THAT RIGHT TO 
OWN AND CONTROL PROPERTY AND RECEIVE 
FREELY UNABRIDGED ACCESS TO FREE SPEECH, 
THE FREE PRESS, RELIGION, PEACEABLE 
ASSEMBLY AND REDRESS OF GREIVANCES. 
Unalienable individual rights, the United States 
Constitution, United States felony statutes, among other 
United States statutes supercede the Communication 
Commission (FCC) regulation which preempts State and Local 
regulation of earth satellite receive only antennas. 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
federal law (particularly felony statutes) may preempt a 
state law where conflict exists between the federal and 
state law. U.S. Constitition, Article VI. 
2. Similarly federal regulations may preempt state and 
local laws. Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 81 L.Ed.2d 580 
(1984) . Federal regulation preempts local law when Congress 
or the federal agency has exercised complete authority in 
the area in question and if the agency is legally authorized 
to preempt local law. New York v. FCC, 100 L.Ed.2d 45, 57-
59 (1988). 
In this case both Congress and the FCC have exercised 
their regulatory authority over satellite receive only dish 
antennas. Even if the FCC had not preempted state and local 
zoning, the U. S. and Utah Constitutions preclude the 
possibility of the Congress, the FCC, the State or the City 
from making a law that prevents reception of radio and 
television signals by the people of the United States or of 
the State of Utah. Mr. Palmer's right to receive satellite 
signals is not regulated by Congress and the FCC. The 
Constitution forbids Congress and the FCC from interfering 
with his right to receive free speech and to receive free 
1 
press. If Congress can limit freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press, then there is no freedom of speech and no 
freedom of the press. If the State and City can abridge 
these freedoms then the United States and Utah Constitution 
have failed to protect the rights of the people. 
1 
First Amendment Cases: 
Cord Meyer Development Co. v. Bell Bay Drugs, 229 N.E.2d 44 
(S.Ct N.Y.1967). Konisberg v. State Bar of California, 366 
U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 514 (1977). People of Canton Township v. Brenner, Case 
No. 85 CT 3551, (35th Judicial Cir., State of Michigan, 
September 26, 1985). Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367 (1969). Shad v. Borough of Mt. Ephram, 452 U.S. 61 
(1981). Swain v. County of Winnebago, 250 N.E.2d 439 (111. 
App. 1969). United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Comsumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
Fifth Amendment Cases: 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
(1978) . 
Fourteeth Amendment Cases: 
Bourgeois v. Parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana, 628 F. Supp 
159 (E.D. La. 1986) . Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, (1978). Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948) . 
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POINT III. 
SALT LAKE CITY'S ORDINANCE DIFFERENTIATES 
BETWEEN SATELLITE RECEIVE-ONLY ANTENNAS AND 
OTHER TYPES OF ANTENNA FACILITIES; DOES NOT HAVE 
A REASONABLE AND CLEARLY DEFINED HEALTH, SAFETY 
OR AESTHETIC OBJECTIVE; AND THE CITY'S ORDINANCE 
OPERATES TO IMPOSE UNREASONABLE LIMITATIONS 
ON, OR PREVENT, RECEPTION OF SATELLITE DELIVERED 
SIGNALS BY RECEIVE-ONLY ANTENNAS AND TO IMPOSE 
COSTS ON THE USERS OF SUCH ANTENNAS THAT ARE 
EXCESSIVE IN LIGHT OF THE PURCHASE AND INSTALLA-
TION COST OF THE EQUIPMENT, AND IS PREEMPTED BY 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, AND BY 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND LAWS AND 47 CFR 25.104. 
1. Salt Lake City's ordinance specifically regulates 
satellite antennaes only and limits them to required back 
yards of lots containing 5000 square feet or more, and does 
not permit them to be located at any other location or to be 
used at all on nonconforming land, or as, or on, a 
nonconforming structure, or as a nonconforming use without 
a special permit or variance after payment of an illegal and 
false fee, and which permit can only be acquired after the 
holding of an advertised public hearing, regardless of the 
circumstances, and the ordinance prohibits all other types 
of antennas (including all radio, VHF and UHF), on property 
in the entire city, and imposes a daily fine of one thousand 
false dollars and up to six months in jail upon users who 
place the satellite antennaes anywhere else, and requires 
the enforcement officers to prevent the use of any land, 
structure or premises that locates a satellite antennae any 
where else, all of which is expressly contrary to the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, including felony 
-*t- Db-S 
statutes, and expressly contrary to the Constitution and 
laws of the State of Utah as pointed out in this reply brief 
and in appellant's original brief on appeal, and is 
expressly contrary to the Federal District Court decision 
in Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696 F.Supp. 1024 
(D.N.J. 1988), which was a civil rights action brought under 
42 U.S.C.A. 1983, in which the backyard only requirement of 
the Township of Maplewood, New Jersey was declared void, for 
conflicting with federal law, and for being expressly 
preempted by 47 CFR 25.104, and for user variance provision. 
2. The Salt Lake zoning ordinance is clearly preempted 
by federal law because the City ordinance does most clearly 
differentiate between satellite receive only antennaes and 
other types of antennas and has unreasonable and not clearly 
defined health, safety or aesthetic objectives, and it does 
operate to impose unreasonable limitations on, or prevent 
reception of signals and is insensitive to the technical 
nature and specific unobstructed, clear line of sight, 
reception "open window" requirements of Satellite Antennas 
necessary in order to receive and reflect and transmit the 
satellite received signals on any given site. Van Meter v. 
Township of Maplewood, 696 F.Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988), 
(Set out VERBATIM IN APPENDIX "AA") This is grounds for 
reversal of the trial court, even if the trial court had had 
lawful jurisdiction, which it never obtained. The Utah Court 
of Appeals not only lacks appellate jurisdiction, but lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction to question the authority of the 
FCC relative to the preemption order, Van Meter, supra 1032. 
Point IV. 
MR. PALMER1S 150 ISSUES ARE GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL. 
The balance of Mr. Palmer's 150 issues including the 
trial court lacking jurisdiction because judges are not 
compensated in gold and silver Coin and defendant's fine not 
being valid because tender was in void currency rather than 
current gold and silver Coin not only have substantial merit 
but are vital to due process of law and the survival of the 
United States of America as a free and independent nation. 
No person can Constitutionally qualify for the office of a 
judge in the United States of America who is not compensated 
in gold and silver Coin of undiminished value according to a 
fixed standard of weight and value measured in units of 
silver, because, if otherwise, Constitutional law ends and 
unconstitutional law begins. 
Mr. Palmer asserts every provision of the United States 
and Utah Constitutions and all the laws made pursuant 
thereto or in pursuance thereof, in his defense, and waives 
none of them at anytime. Every Provision of the Utah and 
United States Constitutions are relevant to his defense, and 
to the existence of the United States as a Constitutional 
Republic. Diminish the quanitity of silver in the Dollar 
and you diminish the dollar itself and the compensation of 
every public officer, legislative, executive and judicial, 
and if that is possible, then the President and judges are 
not subject to receiving undiminished compensation during 
their term of office or during good behavior. Of course, 
a term and good behavior ends as the judge begins to uphold 
unconstitutional void notes and tokens rather than gold and 
silver Coin at full weight and value and the fraudulent 
government replaces the true government and the correct 
principles of government are replaced with the wisdom of 
unwise men and women, who sell themselves for that which has 
no value, worthless, promiseless, void notes, and corrupted 
token coins made from the dross of silver and gold, and 
deceits, deceptions and lying words replace the truth in 
government, and the oath bound servants of the people become 
the unoathbound tyrants of the corrupted nation and states 
in the United States of America and government breaks down 
and fails in the eyes of those at home and abroad and the 
people are led into bondage and captivity because they have 
accepted paper for gold, and dross for silver, and lies for 
truth, and unsubcribed and unfiled oaths of office as 
subscribed and filed oaths of office, and invalid laws for 
valid laws, invalid constitutional amendments for valid 
constitutional provisions, unauthorized courts for 
authorized courts, unauthorized judges for authorized 
judges, void court decisions for valid decisions, wickedness 
for happiness, foolishness for wisdom, and errors for 
accuracy, incompleteness for completeness, incompentency for 
competency, corruption for incorruption, void divorces and 
void marriages for valid marriages. Thus, this corruption 
continues to increase in the earth as the just are divided, 
persecuted and dishonored by the gainsayers and the power 
seekers because of evil money and wickedness in high places, 
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POINT V. 
SALT LAKE CITY UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DEPRIVED MR. PALMER 
OF A BUSINESS LICENSE BECAUSE HE DID NOT APPLY FOR A 
VARIANCE FOR A SATELLITE ANTENNA WHEN U. S. AND UTAH 
CONSTITUTIONS PROHIBIT, AND FEDERAL LAW PREEMPT, STATE 
AND LOCAL ZONING OR "OTHER REGULATION" OF SATELLITE 
ANTENNAS WHICH PREVENT RECEPTION OF SATELLITE SIGNALS. 
Mr. Palmer was denied a business license by the Salt 
Lake City License Department in violation of 47 CFR 25.104 
in order to control and regulate satellite antennae use by 
means of criminal conspiracy and unlawful coercion under 
preempted, unlawful, unconstitutional and void city license 
ordinances which are used to corruptly enforce void zoning 
ordinances by first requiring a business license to do 
business in the City and then corruptly denying a business 
license without due process of law, and based only on false 
accusations by zoning department personnel, thus regulating 
use of a satellite antenna by denial of a business license, 
thereby using "other regulation" to interfere with either 
the transmission or reception, or both, of a federally 
regulated satellite signal, and also interfering with the 
rights of Mr. Palmer in violation of the United States 
Constitution, Amend. I; 18 U.S.C.A. 1367, 47 U.S.C.A. 151, 
47 U.S.C.A. 705; 18 U.S.C.A. 241, and 242; 47 CFR 25.104, 
and Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sees. 7, 15, among others. 
Ordinance under which satellite dish antenna 
users who could not achieve reception within 
constraints imposed by ordinance could apply 
for a zoning variance would not be satisfactory 
and would not save ordinance, which placed an 
unreasonable restriction on signal reception, 
from preemption by Federal Communications 
Commission order. Van Meter v. Township of 
Maplewood, 696 F.Supp. 1024, 1025. (D.N.J. 1988) 
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When Mr. Palmer went to renew his business license for 
the year 1988, on February 15, 1988, Edna M. Drake and Frank 
Friberg, Salt Lake City Corporation's License Department 
enforcement officers, began processing the license forms and 
had started typing the forms as Mr. Palmer's records were 
brought up on the computer screen and then they stopped 
processing the forms. They told Mr. Palmer the computer 
showed that the zoning department had placed a hold on the 
business license because of some problem with a satellite 
antenna, and they told Mr. Palmer he would have to clear 
that problem up with Mr. Spangenberg in zoning before they 
could issue him a license. They both gave Mr. Palmer their 
business cards (Appellant's Brief on Appeal Appendix "V"). 
These persons were both subpoenaed to testify in Mr. 
Palmer's defense but the subpoenas were quashed ex parte 
without a hearing and Mr. Palmer's hired attorney failed to 
have these persons subpoenaed for the trial. (Copies of the 
subpoenas are in Appellant's Brief on Appeal Appendix at H7 
and Hll). 
This conduct unconstitutionally deprived Mr. Palmer of 
his secured right to participate in Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce based on zoning department decisions and business 
department decisions relating to a satellite antenna that 
was claimed by the zoning department personnel to be placed 
improperly at Mr. Palmer's licensed business location at 
933 Pennsylvania Place in Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 
16, 1987, and continuously thereafter. Mr. Palmer showed 
Mr. Spangenberg his business license certificate for 1987. 
Mr. Spangenberg said, "I see no problem with this license." 
Mr. Palmer told Mr. Spangenberg, "I have an inalienable 
right to have a satellite antenna," and that state and local 
zoning and "other regulation" of satellite antennas is 
preempted by federal law and that it is a federal felony to 
interfere with his right to receive the satellite signals. 
Mr. Palmer was not only charged with violating the City 
antenna ordinance provisions but he was denied his right to 
obtain a city license to continue to trade in interstate and 
foreign commerce because of false criminal charges brought 
against him because of his excercise of his inalienable 
right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press and of 
freedom of religion and freedom to peaceably assemble, and 
of his inalienable right to life, liberty and property. 
The zoning "officers" told Mr. Palmer he would have to 
apply for a variance by paying Salt Lake City Corporation a 
fee of $50 (Fifty Dollars) and that the department had never 
issued a variance for a satellite antenna. They said if Mr. 
Palmer didn't apply for a variance for the satellite antenna 
they would take away his business license, but if Mr. Palmer 
would apply for a variance, then they would forget about the 
business license and go away and leave Mr. Palmer alone. 
Mr. Palmer said, that is extortion. (TR 121, 122, 123, 124; 
Appendix "BB) (Also see the Eight (8) page letter to Mr. 
Spangenberg, et al, of January 4, 1988, in Appendix "I" of 
Apellantfs Brief on Appeal, and copies of the 1984 and 1987 
business license certificates in Appendix "V" of Appellant's 
Brief on Appeal.) 
POINT VI. 
COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION DID FALL 
VERY FAR BELOW ANY STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS; 
DEFENDANT HAS PROVED SPECIFIC, IDENTIFIED ACTS 
AND OMISSIONS THAT FALL OUTSIDE THE WIDE RANGE 
OF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENT ASSISTANCE AND THOSE 
ACTS AND OMISSIONS ARE NOT SPECULATIVE BUT ARE IN 
REALITY FACTS WHICH SHOW AFFIRMATIVELY REASONABLE 
PROBABILITY THAT BUT FOR COUNSEL'S ERROR THE TRIAL 
RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT, BECAUSE THE JURY 
VERDICT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNDERMINED COMPLETELY WITH 
ALL CONFIDENCE IN RELIABILITY OF THE VERDICT GONE. 
U.S.C.A. CONST. AMEND. 6. 
Edna M. Drake and Frank Friberg, of Salt Lake City 
Corporation's License Department, among others, and also 
Mr. Craig Spangenberg and Mr. Merrill Nelson of zoning 
were subpoenaed by Mr. Palmer to testify in Mr. Palmer's 
defense but the court denied him compulsory service of 
process by quashing the subpoenas ex parte without a hearing 
and Mr. Palmer's hired attorney (a purported officer of the 
court) failed to subpoena these witnesses for trial and 
neglected to inform Mr. Palmer until just before the start 
of the July 5, 1988, jury trial, that they had not been 
subpoenaed as witnesses to testify in his defense along with 
the other persons the attorney failed to subpoena. 
Besides failing to prepare for the trial, the attorney 
failed to subpoena the defense witnesses demanded by and 
previously subpoenaed by the defendant, Mr. Palmer. Mr. 
Palmer fully expected the witnesses he named in his 
subpoenas to be subpoenaed by his attorney to testify for 
his defense, but the attorney failed to even prepare the 
subpoenas and he also failed to tell the defendant that they 
would not be subpoenaed for his defense when their testimony 
was crucial to establish the record, essential to receiving 
a fair and impartial trial, and critical to receiving due 
process of law in exercise of the accused's right to defend 
in person or by counsel. Counsel, instead of assisting in 
the defense, first agreed that the defendant was right, then 
avoided the defendant, while continually promising to write 
and file a brief or memorandum of law ordered by the court 
to be filed in support of the defendant's motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction. He did not perform that specific 
service for which he was hired, and which, he promised he 
would do. Mr. Bybee omitted filing the brief and extremely 
important memorandum, the main purpose for which he was 
hired and for which he was paid in true United States coined 
money silver dollar units. (Appellant's Brief on Appeal 
Appendix Gl, Gil, G12, G13), U.S. Const. Art. I, Sees. 8-10 
Except for court room experience, Mr. Palmer was far 
better informed and prepared for trial than Mr. Bybee. Mr. 
Bybee directly interfered with and hindered his defense. 
The only witness the defense counsel called was the 
defendant and had him testify against himself, hinging Mr. 
Palmer's whole defense on the fact that there was no 
evidence that Mr. Palmer had placed the Satellite antenna 
on his property on or about January 6, 1988, because it had 
been placed there by someone else more than two full years 
before January 6, 1988. The attorney assured the defendant 
that there was no possible way that he could be convicted 
for doing something on January 6, 1988, that had been done 
in November of 1985, by another person (TR 161). 
Mr. Bybee failed to fully and knowledgeably argue the 
law, failed to ask the defendant many pertinent questions 
during the trial, failed to prepare the necessary jury 
instructions for the defense. The jury instructions were 
hastily and very poorly drawn up without the participation 
of the defendant, and most of the applicable law was not 
even utilized, particularly the parts that prove beyond all 
doubt that Mr. Palmer's property was and is a piece of 
nonconforming land, with a nonconforming structure with a 
nonconforming use, without a required front, side or rear 
yard, or a required lot, and with every right in the world 
to have access to satellite transmission signals under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States and the 
Constitution and laws of the State of Utah, which is so 
clearly pointed out in the Van Meter case supra, the Capital 
Cities case, supra, and the Red Lion Case, Appendix "0" of 
Appellant1s Brief on Appeal. It is the right of the viewing 
public that is paramount, not that of the broadcaster. Not 
even Congress can pass a law that abridges the rights of the 
viewing public. This material on the right of the defendant 
to receive the signal and the lack of local jurisdiction to 
interfere with the signal and the nonconforming land, 
structure and use, should have been fully briefed by the 
Attorney, who had the information in his possession for more 
than four months before the July 5, 1988, jury trial. The 
defendant has been forced to defend himself against Salt 
Lake City, the License Department, the Zoning Department, 
the State of Utah, the circuit court, and the officers of 
the courts, including his own defense counsel, because not a 
single person involved in any of the above named offices, 
institutions or departments will obey their oath of office 
or the laws of the land. An honest "judge" or person, or an 
honest "attorney" who would obey his oath of office would 
disqualify himself when he discovered his compensation and 
bar fees were unconstitutional, unlawful, criminal and void. 
Mr. Bybee specifically said to Mr. Palmer, "I believe you 
are right, but I will not go to the wall with you and be 
shot." In other words, I will defend you even if you insist 
on paying me in silver coin of standard regulated value, 
when I obtained my license through use of fraudulent funds, 
but I will only defend you to the point that I think it will 
not cost me my fraudulently obtained license, and my access 
to my fraudulently obtained legal fees. Mr. Bybee was 
willing enough to take the up front silver dollars, but he 
was not willing to do what was ethically and morally right 
to do to earn them in a case in which he said he believed 
the defendant's position was Constitutionally, ethically, 
morally, legally and in truth, correct. He even discouraged 
the defendant from making an appeal, and encouraged him to 
remove the satellite antenna and apply for a variance, 
instead of doing his homework, his legal research, getting 
up on the subject he believed was at bar, and defending his 
client who was willing to pay him for performance according 
to the truth and the Constitutional law of the land, but who 
was not willing to continue to pay him for nonperformance or 
for wholly inadquate and substandard performance. 
If Mr. Palmer had ask Mr. Bybee to appeal, how could he 
trust him to file the required papers, or challenge the 
jurisdiction of the trial court on appeal when he promised, 
but failed, to file the original papers he was paid to write 
and file on the same subject matter under the court order. 
Mr. Hamp, the assistant city prosecutor, and counsel 
for the respondent had first hand knowledge that Mr. Bybee 
failed to file the brief or memorandum of law in support of 
the motion to dismiss, and also that Mr. Bybee did not take 
the matter to a federal court as was done in the Van Meter 
case, supra, in order to get an injunction, as had been 
suggested by Mr. Palmer to Mr Bybee the first day. Attorney 
Bybee did not use his legal expertise to defend his client, 
but to the contrary, he neglected his duty to the truth, the 
law and to his client. All Mr. Palmer ever asked Mr. Bybee 
to do for him was to defend him according to the truth and 
according to the Constitutional law of the land. Mr. Bybee 
failed at both, and did not effectively assist Mr. Palmer in 
his defense, but compromised with the prosecution and the 
court even though he knew both of them were wrong, but he 
had been a fellow prosecutor with the judge. So Mr. Palmer 
had three prosecutors working against his true defense 
because his defense threatened their way of making a living. 
Mr. Bybee never did know during the trial which type of 
zoning district Mr. Palmer's property was located in and the 
prosecution failed to demonstrate it to the court, and Mr. 
Bybee kept asking Mr. Palmer about R-l, R-2, and R-3 zones, 
and Mr. Palmer directly told him, Well you ask the wrong 
question. Mr Bybee allowed the judge to limit his questions 
to R-l, R-2 and R-3, districts, when Mr. Palmer's property 
is not in any one of them (TR 109). The trial record 
never established in which type of district Mr. Palmer's 
property was located. Nor was it ever established what the 
specific size of a required front yard should have been in 
the district in which Mr. Palmer's property was located. It 
was just assumed by the "judge and the jury" that Mr. Palmer 
had a required front yard even though there was no evidence 
before the court to that effect, except for Mr. Palmer's 
testimony that he did not have a required front yard and 
that the ordinance only applied to required front yards (TR 
102). The foundation was never laid to prove the verdict, 
that the satellite antenna was in a "required front yard". 
The time was not proved, the address was wrong, and the 
property has no required front yard as defined in the code. 
The verdict failed on all six essential elements and Mr. 
Bybee did not even think he could win on appeal. 
If Mr. Bybee had studied the court cases necessary for 
writing the brief he would have known that state and local 
zoning and other regulation that interferes with or operates 
to prevent reception of satellite signals by home satellite 
antennas users is preempted by U.S. law and that purported 
laws operating to prevent reception are unconstitutional 
and void from the outset. Van Meter, supra, Capitol Cities, 
supra, Red Lion, supra, U.S.C.A. Amend. I, and Amend. 21. 
Nothing could be more clear and obvious to anyone famil-
iliar with this case and the relevant rules, Constitutional 
provisions, laws, ordinances and regulations, Counsel was 
clearly ineffective and the verdict was void fron the day 
it was rendered for a multitude of reasons, including the 
fact that the circuit court system is without a statutory 
or constitutional basis for claiming jurisdiction, and 
the fact that the city ordinance is preempted and void, and 
the evidence does not support the verdict when viewed in a 
light most favorable to the jury. There is no question 
that effective assistance of counsel would have brought 
about a different result. There is more than reasonable 
grounds for reversal based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel. State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986). The 
decision of the Supreme Court in the Frame case is void for 
failure of the "Senators", who unofficially confirmed the 
justices, to subscribe and file their oaths of office for 
the years 1975 through 1989, so Frame was also denied due 
process of law, and his judges were falsely paid void money. 
There is no evidence "Mr. Palmer" placed an "unauthor-
ized structure" in a "required front yard" setback, on "his" 
property at "933 East Pennsylvania Avenue", in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on or about January 6, 1988 at 11:20 a.m., nor 
was evidence introduced to prove intent. SLC Code 1.12.030 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
There is no evidence, "That on or about January 6, 1988, 
at 11:20 a.m., the defendant, Bruce Palmer, did place in his 
yard at 933 East Pennsylvania Avenue, a satellite dish." 
(TR 141) There was no jury instruction given concerning SLC 
Code 1.12.030. Mr. Palmer does not own property at 933 East 
Pennsylvania Avenue. He has never owned property at that 
address. There is no Pennsylvania Avenue in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. A proper court would take judicial notice that there 
is no Pennsylvania Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah. See the 
Metropolitan Street Guide in the Salt Lake City telephone 
directory and the maps in the office of the County Recorder. 
Both the Information and the Jury Instructions contained 
Avenue, which is not true. So, the prosecution, the "judge" 
and the "jury" didn't pay attention to the true facts. A 
true example of the blind leading the blind and the blind 
instructing the blind and all of them, the prosecutor, the 
judge and the jurors acting together in denying the truth 
and falling into the pit they dug for their neighbor, all 
because he understood and exercised his right to own and 
operate a home satellite antenna on his own property. The 
city council, the mayor, the city prosecutor, the zoning 
officers and the licensing officers, the "judge" and the 
"jury" all tried to stop the defendant from exercising his 
rights, denying themselves the same rights, and bringing the 
state's legal system into disrepute, a natural consequence 
of trying to govern outside the bounds of the United States 
Constitution-the supreme law of the land, by city ordinance. 
